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Summary 
This report assesses the interests of the most relevant state and non-state actors in Afghanistan 
and Central Asia in the aftermath of the 2014 Afghan presidential election. It is guided by the 
premise that the armed conflict in Afghanistan should be understood as being heavily inter-
twined with regional politics. Its purpose is to serve as an overview of the negotiation environ-
ment in Afghanistan and Central Asia. It identifies actors, interests, and relationships that are 
helpful to take into consideration when sequencing and orchestrating a peace process that could 
de-escalate the war in Afghanistan and help build a more stable and cooperative region. The ma-
jority of the report focuses on relevant actors and their network of relationships, and the conclu-
sion details three future scenarios and a set of recommendations that could facilitate a coordinat-
ed negotiation process. 
The new Afghan Government of National Unity, led by President Ashraf Ghani and Chief 
Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah, includes politicians with a broad range of ideological back-
grounds and interests. While Ghani has spoken out in favor of peace negotiations with the Af-
ghan insurgency, it is so far unclear if his efforts will be more successful than those of his prede-
cessor. As in the case of the Karzai administration, many Afghan warlords are closely affiliated 
with or members of the government. The insurgency considers most warlords to be corrupt war 
criminals. Within Afghan civil society, many demand that war crimes committed by all sides in 
decades of war and civil war, by warlords and Taliban alike, should be prosecuted, and that the 
government should do more to fight corruption and ensure an inclusive political process. 
Regardless of the transition of power from Hamid Karzai to Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Ab-
dullah, the insurgency continues its armed struggle against the security forces of the government 
and the remaining NATO and US forces in Afghanistan. The dominant insurgent group is the 
“Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the Afghan Taliban, followed by the Haqqani network which is 
allied with the Taliban, and the Islamic Party led by the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The 
Taliban consider the Afghan government a pro-American “puppet regime” and argue that the 
current constitution was dictated by the United States. They demand the complete removal of 
foreign soldiers from Afghanistan, the removal of their leaders from the UN terrorist lists, and 
recognition as a legitimate political actor by the international community. They demand a harsh 
interpretation of Islamic law in Afghanistan in order to restore “Islamic stability,” while strug-
gling to emancipate themselves from the ISI, Pakistan’s Directorate for Inter-Services Intelli-
gence. 
While Afghanistan moved into the center of US foreign policy following the 9/11 terrorist at-
tacks, in the eyes of many Americans, its war in Afghanistan has now come to an end. Indeed, the 
vast majority of US and NATO soldiers have withdrawn from Afghanistan, but the number of 
civilian casualties in the country has reached a record high. The US maintains a small military 
presence with its “Operation Freedom’s Sentinel” which has a dual mandate of counterterrorism 
operations and supporting NATO’s new “Resolute Support” Mission in training, assisting, and 
advising the Afghan National Security Forces. The United Nations continues to support Afghani-
stan with its Assistance Mission (UNAMA). The Afghan Taliban question the neutrality of the 
UN in Afghanistan and accuse it of being pro-American. UNAMA has repeatedly called on Af-
ghan government, insurgency, and international forces to protect civilians from harm and to 
fulfill their obligations under international humanitarian law. 
While the Afghan Taliban provided shelter to former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden when 
they ruled Afghanistan, they have been cautious not to aggressively embrace a global Jihadist 
agenda within the last decade. Instead, they repeatedly reaffirmed their primary objective of lib-
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erating Afghanistan from foreign occupation. Hence, while the Afghan Taliban have arguably 
moved away from al-Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban are believed to have strengthened their ties 
with transnational militant Islamists. Pakistan’s Tribal Areas along the Afghan border remain the 
home base for a variety of Islamist groups with different goals and agendas. In spite of these ideo-
logical differences and internal clashes, they share a conservative Sunni interpretation of Islamic 
law and claim to fight for the end of foreign, non-Muslim interference in Muslim lands. Many 
groups skillfully connect local grievances with a transnational, Islamist agenda in order to recruit 
followers. Different separatist sentiments in Central Asia are thus intertwined with both religious 
and geostrategic questions in this volatile region. 
Facing many internal problems, Pakistan is struggling to manage the ISI’s ties with the Af-
ghan Taliban and other militant groups, while trying to balance the desire for relative stability in 
Afghanistan with limiting Indian influence over its neighbor. India, in return, seeks to reduce 
Pakistani influence in Afghanistan and aims to expand economic cooperation with Kabul, while 
the disputed region of Kashmir continues to be a hot spot between the two nuclear powers. Iran 
has played an important role in the international efforts to rebuild Afghanistan, while the US 
accuses Tehran of maintaining ties with parts of the insurgency. Turkey pursues an assertive role 
in the Middle East and in Central Asia, has provided substantial development aid to Afghanistan, 
and has led a variety of diplomatic initiatives in the region. China increasingly emerges as Rus-
sia’s main rival in infrastructure and energy affairs in Central Asia and its Metallurgical Group 
Corporation (MCC) has secured the $3 billion contract for the Aynak copper mine in Afghani-
stan. Beijing now embraces a policy in favor of intra-Afghan reconciliation, and it has encour-
aged Pakistan to play a more productive role in facilitating the Taliban’s participation in peace 
talks. Russia is strengthening its ties with several Central Asian republics with which it shares a 
long cultural and colonial history. While neither Moscow nor Beijing wishes to see a permanent 
Western military presence in Central Asia, they are even less interested in Afghanistan collapsing 
into chaos which they fear would further fuel militant Islamism across the region. 
The Arab States of the Persian Gulf are also involved. Saudi Arabia seeks to contain Iranian 
influence by providing support to Sunni groups in Central Asia. Funding for radical organiza-
tions and madrassas in Pakistan can be traced back to wealthy donors from Saudi Arabia. The 
United Arab Emirates has increased its cooperation with the US, has sent troops to southern 
Afghanistan, and hosts the Al Dhafra Air Base. Qatar tries to project itself as a neutral mediator 
in peace negotiations in Afghanistan, though the talks related to the Taliban’s official political 
office in Doha have stalled. 
While there is no coherent policy of the Central Asian states towards Afghanistan, they have 
expressed concerns over the winding down of NATO’s military presence. Tajikistan pays atten-
tion to the developments in Kabul due to its long border, because militant Islamists from Af-
ghanistan were once active in Tajikistan’s civil war, and since Tajiks are the second largest ethnic 
group in Afghanistan. Aspiring to become a main regional transportation hub, Uzbekistan bene-
fits from intense competition between Chinese and Indian firms, while facing various militant 
Islamist groups, some of which have ties with the Afghan Taliban. Turkmenistan, home to some 
of the largest undeveloped oil and natural gas fields in the world, tries to shield itself from the 
political turmoil in Afghanistan, while expanding economic and energy-related ties with Kabul 
and striving to achieve political and economic independence from Russia. Kazakhstan tries to 
advance its relations with the West while not alienating Russia in order to maintain its “multi-
vector foreign policy.” Kyrgyzstan is struggling with drug smuggling and human trafficking orig-
inating in Afghanistan and seeks to benefit from regional infrastructure projects such as the Rus-
sia-backed and Uzbekistan-opposed Kambarata hydroelectric project, intended to export energy 
to Afghanistan. 
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The Afghanistan conflict does in fact consist of at least five overlapping sub-conflicts. First, 
the armed conflict between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and other insurgent groups on 
one side and the Afghan government on the other side can be considered a conflict of legitimacy. 
The Taliban see themselves as the honorable defenders of Afghanistan and Islam in a just war 
against Western invaders and a corrupt pro-American “puppet regime.” Second, within Afghan 
society, conservatives and reformists experience a conflict of modernization about the role of 
tradition and religion in society. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and other insurgents exploit 
this conflict by demonizing proponents of democratization and liberalization as Western agents. 
Third, the withdrawal of most US and NATO troops in combination with the unsettled armed 
conflict may lead to an escalation of ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic Afghanistan. The uncertain 
future may provide incentives to Afghan warlords to mobilize their followers along ethnic lines 
and to activate transnational ties with ethnic diasporas or foreign sponsors. Fourth, while power-
holders and traditional elites have benefitted from the influx of money during a decade of nation-
building, large segments of the Afghan population are suffering from poverty and violence. The 
resulting gap between wealthy and poor Afghans fuels socio-economic tensions which, combined 
with endemic corruption, increase distrust in the political system. Fifth, a complicated regional 
environment that may be characterized as a regional security dilemma in Central Asia further 
aggravates the situation in fragmented and unstable Afghanistan. The lack of institutionalized 
dialogue and confidence-building measures across the region provides incentives to various gov-
ernments to support their Afghan proxies in order to hedge against a loss of influence. This has 
negative consequences for intra-Afghan reconciliation and societal peace. The regional security 
dilemma is further fueled by transnational militant Islamism, separatist sentiments, and tradi-
tional geopolitical rivalries. 
This uncertainty serves as an incentive to all parties, both state and non-state, to engage in 
various “hedging strategies” in order to prevent marginalization. For the states of the region, the 
lack of a legitimate forum or institutional framework that they can rely on in order to balance 
their interests further reinforces patterns of mistrust and misperception. A notable feature of the 
conflict is a shortage of static, reliable, and durable coalitions built on trust among the main par-
ties. Instead, relevant actors, both state and non-state, constantly renegotiate, adjust, or shift their 
alliances, or rely on different actors to advance different goals. Within the network of relation-
ships, some actors, such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and China are placed at strategic 
locations which enable them to play a key role in peace talks. 
Considering the variety of state and non-state actors and their often diverging interests, the 
different sub-conflicts, as well as the complicated network of relationships, three future scenarios 
seem to be equally likely as Afghanistan and Central Asia approach the fifteenth anniversary of 
the beginning of the US-led military invasion in 2001. 
In a worst-case scenario, the conflict of legitimacy between insurgency and Afghan govern-
ment dramatically escalates, all efforts to end the war remain completely fruitless, the govern-
ment of unity disintegrates into factions and tribal thinking, and the states of the region fail to 
increase cooperation and build trust, instead hedging their bets by beefing up support for their 
preferred Afghan and other proxies. As a result, Afghanistan would enter another, even more 
brutal, decade of civil war in which the central government merely controls the urban centers, 
while the Afghan Taliban and their allies expand their control in the rest of the country and dif-
ferent warlords struggle to carve out their own de-facto states in their strongholds. The level of 
violence would increase, and even more civilians would be harmed and killed. For the radical 
wings of the different militant Islamist movements in the region, such an outcome would be 
good news, since political, socio-economic, and separatist grievances across Central Asia would 
grow, waiting to be exploited by the advocates of new political orders based on harsh interpreta-
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tions of Islamic law. Instability and chaos would grow in Afghanistan and Pakistan alike, and the 
region would face a dark future. 
In a status-quo scenario, a collapse of the Afghan government can be prevented through ne-
gotiations conducted by Ghani and Abdullah, yet a diplomatic breakthrough that would bring 
the Taliban back into the political process cannot be accomplished. As a result, some factions of 
the insurgency whose specific interests are met might join the political process; there may be 
some reforms to the political system, and, potentially, a slight increase of trust between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan. However, large parts of the insurgency continue the armed fight, potentially in 
an even more fragmented, decentralized fashion, and the violence does not cease. Regionally, 
there might be some progress in policy areas on which there is overall agreement, but no “big 
push” for more integration. As a result, Afghanistan and Central Asia will enter a decade of 
“muddling through,” which would not bring a complete deterioration of the security situation, 
but no peace for Afghanistan and no hope for a better future for the region either. 
In an “end-of-war scenario,” the war in Afghanistan will come to an end as the result of inclu-
sive peace negotiations between the government and the insurgency, embedded into a multi-level 
framework and international support and/or mediation. It is difficult to project the path of nego-
tiations, or even the elements of a potential settlement. However, successful peace talks are not an 
unrealistic endeavor. Successful negotiations would have to treat the Afghanistan conflict as in-
tertwined with regional politics in Central Asia. Official talks should be sequenced based on a 
careful analysis of Afghan, regional, and international actors and their internal divisions and 
contradictions. 
While many parties might prefer a “muddling through” over a negotiated settlement with 
painful concessions, the number of parties that would prefer the “worst-case scenario” over the 
same agreement is much lower. Hence, parties that resist accommodation through negotiation 
should be confronted with the constant risk of Afghanistan collapsing into even more chaos as 
long as no substantial and credible steps towards an agreement are undertaken. 
An important goal of an inclusive negotiation process is to replace a system dominated by 
mistrust and hedging strategies with a system dominated by trust and cooperation. Negotiations 
should first address those sub-conflicts and relationships with a high level of violence and risk of 
escalation. If the intra-Afghan conflict of legitimacy, the regional security dilemma, and the com-
plicated relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan are de-escalated by means of negotia-
tions, Afghanistan and Central Asia would move a big step closer towards a cooperative and 
more peaceful future. 
Possible steps include a cease-fire and negotiations without conditions; a credible offer to the 
insurgency to gain international political legitimacy in return for integration into the political 
system; a coordinated negotiation framework; a neutral mediator or mediation team; confidence-
building measures between the main parties on all levels; both state and non-state, changes to the 
political system in Afghanistan within the framework of the constitution, including decen-
tralization, a reform of the role of the provincial governors, and a new election law; the inclusion 
of all levels of the Afghan insurgency into a peace process; potentially a referendum about the 
future of foreign troops in Afghanistan; a non-aggression agreement between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; a Standing Conference for Security and Co-operation in Central Asia; and a “Stability 
Pact for Central Asia” with which the US and the international community would pledge their 
support to this important region. 
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1. Introduction 
14 years after the US-led invasion, a peaceful and secure future for Afghanistan is a remote hope 
at best. An armed insurgency steps up its attacks against the national security forces of the fragile 
state, neighboring countries cooperate with their proxies on Afghan soil, and the new govern-
ment is struggling to navigate domestic cleavages and regional security risks in an international 
environment plagued with transnational militant Islamism, economic problems, and geopolitical 
rivalries. 
The complexity of the Afghanistan conflict which involves a variety of state and non-state ac-
tors and has both a national and a transnational dimension makes attempts to launch an inclu-
sive negotiation process very difficult. This report takes stock of the relevant Afghan, regional, 
and international actors, both state and non-state, and assesses their interests in the context of 
the Afghanistan conflict, and their multiple connections, rivalries, and alliances. It serves as an 
overview of the negotiation environment in Afghanistan and Central Asia and identifies actors, 
interests, and relationships that help understand the challenge that negotiators face when identi-
fying steps towards a peace agreement in this volatile region. It is guided by the premise that the 
conflict in Afghanistan should be understood as heavily intertwined with regional politics. 
This introduction lays out purpose and scope of the report, gives an overview of five different 
sub-conflicts that underpin the armed conflict in Afghanistan, and explains the category scheme 
used in the actors’ assessments which make up the main part of the paper, as well as its overall 
structure. 
1.1 Purpose and scope 
This report seeks to outline the political environment in which any Afghanistan peace process 
would have to unfold. Its main purpose is to offer a snapshot of the actors and their interests and 
relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia as of early 2015. It focuses on those parties that 
would play a role in a comprehensive multi-level peace agreement for Afghanistan, that have 
strong potential as spoilers, or that should be considered when sequencing a peace process since 
their key interests would be affected. 
Based on this scope, the state and non-state actors to be considered can broadly be grouped 
into seven main clusters of parties. The first cluster includes Afghan actors that act on the basis of 
the Afghan constitution and support the current political system in spite of ideological disagree-
ments. This includes the Afghan government, prominent Afghan warlords, and civil society ac-
tors. The second cluster includes the different factions of the Afghan insurgency, i.e. those actors 
who are also Afghan, but seek to overthrow the current political system by force. These are the 
Afghan Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Islamic Party. The third cluster involves the most 
prominent international actors. Given the purpose of this assessment, the report only focuses on 
those international actors that would play a decisive role in a negotiation process, namely the 
USA and NATO and the United Nations. Actors that are unlikely to be involved in a negotiated 
settlement (such as NGOs, state development agencies, Japan, and individual NATO member 
states) are not analyzed, even if they are undoubtedly active in Afghanistan. The fourth cluster 
involves the different non-Afghan militant Islamist movements in the region which have huge 
potential to be spoilers and multiple connections with the Afghan insurgency. The fifth cluster 
captures the regional powers, i.e. Pakistan, India, Iran, Turkey, China, and Russia. The sixth and 
seventh cluster includes the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the Central Asian states respec-
tively. 
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Since the paper assesses the parties through the lens of the Afghanistan conflict, it does not in-
tend to give a full assessment of entire security strategies that might reach well beyond Afghani-
stan and Central Asia. Only interests relevant for or connected to the Afghanistan conflict are 
touched upon. The report does not intend to reference all previous negotiation attempts or to 
give a historical overview of changing and evolving relationships over time. Instead, it allows the 
reader to quickly access the most important information about an actor in the context of the 
current state of the conflict. 
While the report concludes with policy recommendations related to an inclusive peace pro-
cess, these are not the only way to decode the complex political landscape and should only be 
understood as one possible set of suggestions. 
1.2 Sub-conflicts 
Since the withdrawal of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the new Afghan 
government pushed for a new round of exploratory talks with the insurgency, while the Afghan 
Taliban announced the nomination of a new leader, Mullah Mansour. This report seeks to help 
assess current events in light of the broader political context in Afghanistan and Central Asia. 
It is useful to understand the Afghanistan conflict as a set of interconnected sub-conflicts or 
cleavages. It is the interplay of these cleavages and the interplay of the often multi-faceted rela-
tionships that make a negotiation process so difficult. The five sub-conflicts to keep in mind 
when assessing actors, interests, and relationships are: 
1. The armed conflict between the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and other insurgent groups 
on one side and the Afghan government on the other side can be considered a conflict of legiti-
macy. The Taliban see themselves as the honorable defenders of Afghanistan and Islam in a just 
war against Western invaders and a corrupt pro-American “puppet regime.” 
The conflict of legitimacy is central to the situation in Afghanistan and involves all actors, no-
tably the Afghan government and the insurgency. Historically, Afghanistan does not have a tra-
dition of strong central governments which perpetuates the current crisis in addition to ideologi-
cal differences. “Local populations expect to solve their own problems through mediation and 
arbitration conducted by people of their own choosing” (Herbert 2014: 4). Attempts to create a 
centralized government after 2001 failed to achieve nation-wide legitimacy, since the Karzai gov-
ernment was not able to provide elementary services such as security and a reliable public admin-
istration. The government was never able to play a coherent role that would increase its legitima-
cy in the eyes of the people, given its complicated position between international actors and their 
proxies, Afghan religious and political leaders, and insurgents. The dependence upon interna-
tional aid and military forces also prevented nationalism from becoming an adequate “legitimiz-
ing ideology” (Suhrke 2013: 282–283). Consequently, the government has not been successful in 
defending its monopoly of power. The insurgency accuses it of being un-Islamic and corrupt, 
warlords try to secure their spheres of interest within or against the established political system, 
and civil society has to navigate these hybrid systems of power: “People are affected by a com-
plexity of relationships, dependencies, power through weapons, money, influence and fear. While 
there are real differences of opinion between civil society actors, there are also misperceptions 
and long standing resentments” (Winter 2010: 58). 
The intra-Afghan conflict of legitimacy has a regional equivalent in the fight of a variety of Is-
lamist movements that aim to overthrow different governments that they accuse of cooperating 
to closely with the West. However, a notable difference between most of these radical groups and 
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the Afghan Taliban is that while the latter is strongly driven by nationalist motives, other militant 
Islamists explicitly embrace a transnational Jihadist agenda. 
2. Within Afghan society, conservatives and reformists experience a conflict of moderni-
zation about the role of tradition and religion in society. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and 
other insurgents exploit this conflict by demonizing proponents of democratization and liberali-
zation as Western agents. 
According to opinion polls, 63% of all Afghans agree that women should be allowed to work 
outside the home. While 82% of the women see working as their right, only 51% of the men sup-
port this attitude. 77% of Afghans living in urban areas and 80% of Hazara, but only 50% of Pash-
tuns agree (Asia Foundation 2013: 114). As this example illustrates, interpretations of tradition 
and religion diverge significantly along various lines within Afghan society. Differences of opin-
ion and lifestyle between North and South, generations, gender, and ethnic identities are signifi-
cant. Particularly notable is the urban-rural divide: As part of the international trade network of 
the Silk Road, Afghan cities have historically been the engine of modernization, while in rural 
areas traditional structures of society prevail (Schetter 2004: 12). Additionally, Afghans who re-
turned from exile imported manners alien to the rural population when they moved back to the 
country after 2001. 
Civil and military internationals are thus navigating a challenging cultural environment in 
Afghanistan. Since many of them are not familiar with the values and norms of local communi-
ties, misunderstandings have contributed to a decrease of trust in international actors. For in-
stance, opinion polls in northeastern Afghanistan suggest that the part of the population feeling a 
threat of local traditions and Islamic values by the presence of international NGOs increased 
from 22% in 2007 to 43% in 2009 (BMZ 2010: 19). Overall, the modernization conflict is a con-
flict within Afghan society about the role of religion and tradition and the relationship between 
the individual and his or her community. Even though external actors did intervene in this con-
flict, they did not cause it, since the question of modernization played a role well before the US-
led invasion in 2001. The modernization conflict is especially intertwined with the conflict on 
legitimacy, since the Taliban and other Islamists accuse more liberal Afghans of being controlled 
by or to closely associated with Western culture. 
3. The withdrawal of most US and NATO troops in combination with the unsettled armed 
conflict may lead to an escalation of ethnic tensions in multi-ethnic Afghanistan. The uncertain 
future may provide incentives to Afghan warlords to mobilize their followers along ethnic lines 
and to activate transnational ties with ethnic diasporas or foreign sponsors. 
While some argue that Afghanistan has historically been ruled by Pashtuns, which led to the 
discrimination of other ethnic groups such as Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazara, others question the 
relevance of ethnicity before the jihad against the Soviets started. “The basic category to describe 
one’s affiliation has traditionally been qawm – best translated as ‘solidarity group’” (Simonsen 
2004: 708). A qawm is a fluent construct and may be defined by tribe, religion, profession, or 
other categories. As a consequence of selective international support during the 1980s and the 
following civil war in the 1990s, factions with leaders “encouraging spirals of ethnicised violence” 
emerged (Simonsen 2004: 710). Therefore, this conflict does not result from the mere existence of 
different ethnic groups, but from the construction of ethnic coalitions for political ends 
(Fearon/Laitin 2003: 75). Ethnic tensions in Afghanistan have both a domestic and a transna-
tional component, since foreign governments have ties with their preferred Afghan proxies who 
often belong to specific ethnic groups. 
The frequent employment of “divide and conquer” strategies in the last decades has further 
contributed to the construction of ethnic identity, with each group feeling discriminated in terms 
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of political rights and power (Mujtaba 2013: 246–248). However, most Afghans name their na-
tional before their ethnic identity (ABC/BBC/ARD 2009: 38–40). While ethnicity played a major 
role in the decisions of voters during the recent elections, all candidates showed their willingness 
to form inclusive tickets with presidential and vice-presidential candidates from different ethnic 
groups. Accordingly, the Government of National Unity includes two Pashtuns (Ashraf Ghani 
and Mohammad Khan), one Tajik (Abdullah Abdullah), two Hazara (Sarvar Danish and Mo-
hammad Mohaqeq), and one Uzbek (Abdulrashid Dostum). Nonetheless, regional powerbrokers 
and warlords still base their legitimacy on ethnic identity and could easily use this highly emo-
tional cleavage to delegitimize the central government in a struggle for power. Should the war 
escalate further and should the legitimacy of the central government come under more pressure, 
local strongmen may be tempted to increasingly play the ethnic card, thus perpetuating a spiral 
of mistrust and hostility between the different groups. Luckily, the inclusiveness of the new gov-
ernment has for now prevented such a scenario.  
4. While power-holders and traditional elites have benefitted from the influx of money during 
a decade of nation-building, large segments of the Afghan population are suffering from poverty 
and violence. The resulting gap between wealthy and poor Afghans fuels socio-economic ten-
sions which, combined with endemic corruption, increase distrust in the political system. 
Afghanistan is one of the poorest countries in the world and the war has left its marks on the 
economy. Agriculture, the most important economic sector, “is still 50% below its pre-war (1979) 
level” (Asia Foundation 2013: 47). Afghanistan continues to heavily depend on international aid. 
Still, experts argue that the resulting financial benefits stay in the hands of a small part of the 
Afghan society, with the larger part suffering from increasing prices and rents (Ruttig 2011d). 
Accordingly “inequality edged up in the last years” (World Bank 2014: 8). According to opinion 
polls in 2013, “corruption was the second most frequently mentioned major problem facing Af-
ghanistan” (Asia Foundation 2013: 78). According to Transparency International’s 2014 Corrup-
tion Perception Index, Afghanistan is the third-most corrupt country out of 174 (Transparency 
International 2014). The Karzai government has been unable or unwilling to deal with this prob-
lem, and it is too early to tell if the Ghani administration will deliver on its promise to fight cor-
ruption. Additionally, “opium poppy cultivation continues to provide an economic lifeline for 
large segments of the population and underpins much of the country’s economic growth” 
(Felbab-Brown 2014: 175). 
84 percent of poor Afghans live in the rural areas of the country (World Bank 2014: 21), and 
the improvement of economic conditions after the Taliban period can be felt more in urban than 
in rural areas (Asia Foundation 2013: 48). However, while the harvests in 2012 and 2013 have 
been good, the “economic growth slowed considerably in 2013” in the non-agricultural sectors 
(World Bank 2014: 3), mostly for security reasons and because of a lack of investment. It is hard 
to assess the role of the socio-economic conflict within the overall dynamics of the Afghan civil 
war. While it does not seem to be the core cleavage and while economic motivations are not the 
main driver of the insurgency, unsolved socio-economic problems further undermine the legiti-
macy of the government, facilitate Taliban recruitment efforts, and lead to increasing tensions 
between poorer and wealthier parts of Afghan society. 
Hence, the socio-economic situation in Afghanistan is intertwined with the conflict of legiti-
macy, since the level of violence has a negative impact on sustainable development and on the 
level of foreign private investment. The fact that Afghanistan did not emerge as a major hub for 
transportation, energy, or private investment within the last decade also represents a missed op-
portunity for Central Asia. A more stable and more prosperous Afghanistan would certainly have 
a positive impact on the flows of trade and investment in the region.  
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5. A complicated regional environment that may be characterized as a regional security di-
lemma in Central Asia further aggravates the situation in fragmented and unstable Afghanistan. 
The lack of institutionalized dialogue and confidence-building measures across the region pro-
vides incentives to various governments to support their Afghan proxies in order to hedge 
against a loss of influence. This has negative consequences for intra-Afghan reconciliation and 
societal peace. The regional security dilemma is further fueled by transnational militant Islam-
ism, separatist sentiments, and geopolitical rivalries. 
Pakistan’s tribal areas along the Afghan border are a hotbed for transnational militant Islam-
ism. Most states are struggling with their own militant Islamist movements that aim to end any 
perceived Western influence in Muslim lands. These groups receive generous support from do-
nors in the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. With its “Overseas Contingency Operations,” the US 
seeks to destroy al-Qaeda operatives and other militant Islamists in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In 
Pakistan’s Tribal Areas, the US relies heavily on drone strikes. These areas are the strongholds of 
the Pakistani Taliban who continue their armed struggle against the Pakistani state. Unaddressed 
grievances in Balochistan (Pakistan and Iran), Kashmir (Pakistan, India, China), and Xinjiang 
(China) fuel separatist sentiments that are further exploited by militant Islamists. Regional gov-
ernments blame each other for stirring up instability and violence on each other’s territory. This 
behavior is related to several geopolitical rivalries between states that compete for religious lead-
ership as well as political and economic influence. Examples include Saudi Arabia and Iran, Paki-
stan and India, India and China, US and Russia, US and China, and China and Russia. Some of 
the Central Asian republics benefit from this competition, while others are plagued with political 
instability and severe economic problems. 
Along with the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
(CICA), the “Heart of Asia/Istanbul Process” has emerged as a platform for regional discussion 
on the development in Afghanistan since 2011. While the process has not yet led to a break-
through in regional integration, scholars agree on its importance for keeping up the dialogue 
between the 14 participating states (Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the UAE). 
Still, there have not been significant achievements beyond the announcement of plans for confi-
dence-building measures. “Moscow is reluctant to give full support to the IP [Istanbul Process], 
which is largely connected to its own interests in influencing the HA [Heart of Asia] countries” 
(Quie 2014: 294). “Russia, Pakistan and Iran have rejected anything that vaguely resembles a 
‚mechanism‘, correctly arguing that there are already South and Central Asian mechanisms 
which barely function” (Quie 2014: 296). Due to this lack of liability, there has been no agree-
ment on the organization and funding of planned projects (Kazemi 2014). 
1.3 Structure and category scheme 
The main part of this report is not organized by sub-conflict, but by clusters of actors (Afghan 
politicians and civil society, Afghan insurgency, international actors, other militant Islamist 
movements, regional powers, Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Central Asian states). This 
allows the reader to easily find the assessment of a specific actor. The paper primarily relies on
6 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
secondary sources, such as the work of Afghanistan experts and Central Asia scholars. Occasion-
ally, primary sources from the relevant parties to the conflict are taken into account in order to 
illustrate a party’s position.1 
In chapter 2, Afghan politicians, civil society actors, and warlords, are analyzed. Chapter 3 
deals with the Afghan insurgency and chapter 4 focuses on the most prominent international 
actors, i.e. the US, NATO, and the UN. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the militant Islamist movements 
in Pakistan, chapter 6 deals with the regional powers, including Afghanistan’s neighbors Iran and 
Pakistan, and chapter 7 and 8 shed light on the Arab States of the Persian Gulf and the Central 
Asian States respectively. Chapter 9 presents conclusions which consist of a visualization of the 
network of relationships between the various actors, three brief future scenarios, and recommen-
dations related to an inclusive peace process. 
For purposes of systematic comparison, the paper uses a uniform system of categorization 
which lists the following characteristics of each party: 
Key figure: the most important person that holds formal or informal authority over this party. 
Other influential figures may be referred to in the detailed party’s description. If a party has sev-
eral figures with equal formal or informal authority, they may all be listed. 
Relevant divisions, factions, subgroups, subordinated institutions: in the case of states, rele-
vant institutions that have different interests or involvements related to the Afghanistan conflict; 
in the case of non-state actors, relevant formal or informal internal divisions or factions; in the 
case of organizations, relevant subordinated institutions; mostly only listed if relevant in the con-
text of this assessment. 
Memberships: key organizations or alliances of which a state is a member; only listed if rele-
vant in the context of this assessment. 
Strong ties: the party’s most important allies and partners. The relationship usually includes 
significant material or financial support related to a party’s armed struggle against an armed op-
ponent; the party may either be the donor or the recipient of this support. 
Notable ties: other important partners of the party. The relationship is characterized by mate-
rial, financial, or ideological support, which may or may not be linked to an armed struggle. Ac-
tors with whom the party maintains channels of cooperation and assistance may also be listed 
under this category. 
Armed opponents: actors with whom the party is currently in a state of armed combat. 
Rivals: actors with whom the party is in a state of political, ideological, or economic rivalry 
but with whom there is currently no direct armed combat. Rivalry does not exclude the possibil-
ity of cooperation, and captures a wide range of competitive behavior including conflict over 
contested territory as long as there is no ongoing armed combat. 
 
1 This paper draws on two previous PRIF publications, HSFK Report 4/2013 (“Verhandeln statt Bürgerkrieg”) 
and PRIF Working Paper 20/2014 (“A Network in Transition”). For this report, these publications have been 
merged, updated, and amended. Several people have made contributions to one or both of these papers, or to 
this PRIF report: For critical feedback, thanks are extended to Nicole Deitelhoff, Matthias Dembinski, Cornelius 
Friesendorf, Lauren Glaser, Thorsten Gromes, Karin Hammer, Cornelia Heß, Gregor Hofmann, Andreas Ja-
cobs, Peter Kreuzer, Naser Mohammadi, Bernhard Moltmann, Winfried Nachtwei, Felix Pahl, Dirk Peters, An-
nika Elena Poppe, Bruno Schoch, Niklas Schörnig, Hans-Joachim Spanger, Matt Waldman, Muhammad Waqas, 
Irene Weipert-Fenner, and Jonas Wolff. Special thanks are extended to Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and 
Kyara Klausmann for the contributions they made to this report or to working paper 20/2014 during their 
internships at PRIF. 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 7
 
 
Relevance of conflict: the importance that a party attaches to the situation in Afghanistan in 
comparison with other issues on the party’s agenda. This is not to be confused with the relevance 
of this party for the conflict or with the perception of this party’s relevance by other parties. 
Key interests: most important desires, demands, and objectives of the party which are directly 
or indirectly related to the Afghanistan conflict. 
With party, the paper refers to a state or a non-state actor or a distinguishable group of actors 
or figures involved in the Afghanistan conflict. With figure, the paper means an individual per-
son. An actor may either be a party or a figure. 
Since the report uses the term “key interests” when assessing the parties to the conflict, it is 
necessary to briefly address the advantages and the disadvantages of the concept of “interests.” 
An advantage, especially in the context of an overview such as the one provided in this paper, is 
that it allows for a simplification of the objectives of a specific actor that can quickly be captured 
by the reader. In order to make sense of political conflict, it is necessary to understand what the 
parties want. Taking interests into account instead of focusing only on positions allows for a bet-
ter understanding of a party’s real objectives, including the scope of potential concessions and the 
room for compromise. At the same time, “interest” implies a monolithic and inflexible nature of 
(often competing) political, economic, or strategic objectives that can be misleading. For in-
stance, different domestic groups within a state may have different objectives concerning Af-
ghanistan, and the overall construction of the respective “national interests” is a function of the 
relative strength of these groups, and their ability to negotiate and lobby for their specific goals. 
Parties also reformulate and rethink their interests depending on the way others deal with them, 
depending on how the own role with respect to others is interpreted, and depending on how the 
overall network of relationships evolves over time and how it is perceived. 
The “key interests” of a party which are presented in this report should thus always be dealt 
with in awareness of the shortcoming of this very concept, and the additional information pro-
vided about a party should be taken into account. Actual negotiation moves that target a specific 
party must of course be based on research that reaches well beyond this report, so that action can 
be grounded in a sophisticated, comprehensive understanding of the respective actor. The di-
verse community of Afghanistan and Central Asian scholars has created a rich literature about 
the country and the region which politicians and mediators can access should a formal peace 
process be launched. 
2. Afghan politicians and civil society 
Most political parties in Afghanistan have their roots in Mujahideen factions or alliances that 
emerged during the war against the Red Army in the 1980s. Political alliances are constantly re-
shuffled and the new government of national unity consists of warlords and other politicians 
with very different ideological backgrounds. It is hard to assess who might play a significant role 
in the next years and how cleavages between the unity government and opposing political groups 
and parties that are now somehow affiliated with it break open again. For now, it is useful to dis-
tinguish the current government, the Afghan Warlords, and Afghan civil society. 
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2.1 Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
Key figures President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah 
Subordinated ANSF, HPC 
Memberships Istanbul Process, OIC, SCO (observer), CSTO (observer), Almaty Process, CICA 
Strong ties USA, NATO 
Notable ties Afghan Warlords, India, Iran, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia, China 
Armed opponents IEA, HQN, HIG 
Rivals Pakistan 
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests Maintain stable unity government; defend Afghan state against the insurgency; maintain external financial and military aid; implement constitutional reform 
The “Government of National Unity” is the result of the stalemate after the run-off of the 2014 
presidential elections. While Ashraf Ghani was declared elected President by the Independent 
Election Commission, runner-up Abdullah Abdullah joined the government as Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO). The position is not part of the constitution but is planned to be transformed into 
a Prime Minister by a Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) within two years. According to the deal 
signed by the two candidates, both positions “seem to be rather equal in their powers” (Clark 
2014b). The two teams agreed on “parity in the selection of personnel between the President and 
the CEO at the level of head of key security and economic institutions, and independent direc-
torates” and the “full participation of the CEO” in the appointment of other senior officials. Fur-
thermore the CEO has “specific administrative and financial authorities” and the right to propose 
“reforms in all government agencies” (“Government of National Unity” deal as quoted in Clark 
2014b). 
The new president, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, who received 32% of the votes in the first round 
of the elections and 56% in the run-off, is one of the few Afghan politicians who do not have a 
warlord-background: With his master’s degrees in political science, international relations and 
anthropology, as well as a PhD in anthropology (Columbia University), he had taught at Kabul, 
Berkeley and John Hopkins Universities and worked at the World Bank for ten years before re-
turning to Afghanistan in 2001 when he was appointed minister of finance. In 2004, he decided 
to quit politics and started teaching at Kabul University. In 2005, he founded the Institute for 
State Effectiveness. Recently, his research has focused on failed states and aid programs. While he 
stresses the importance of an independent Afghanistan and has a critical approach towards fi-
nancial aid (Ghani 2005), he has spoken out in favor of long-term Western support, including 
ongoing military presence of US and NATO forces, which he deems necessary to rebuild Afghan-
istan. The four main points of his vision are the promotion of security, accountability, economy 
and education. In his 2014 inauguration speech, Ghani stated that a stable and peaceful Afghani-
stan needs economic reforms, social justice, and an administration free from corruption. He 
emphasized that he wants to maintain good relations with neighboring countries, with Islamic 
states, and with the international community with its “big development organizations” and “big 
private investors” (Office of the President of the IRoA 2014a). Because of his 24 years in exile and 
his Christian-Lebanese wife, some Afghans perceive Ashraf Ghani as an “outsider.” However, as 
Tolo-News points out: “Ghani has undergone a change of image. One could say the realities of 
Afghanistan have caught up with him. Emphasizing his Pashtun ethnicity by adopting his tribal 
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name ‘Ahmadzai’, growing a beard, performing a Hajj pilgrimage and showcasing piousness, 
have all been effective measures” (Baryalay 2014). 
The vice president Abdulrashid Dostum is known as “one of the best equipped and armed 
warlords, ever” (Williams 2012: 3). As an “Afghan with Uzbek ethnicity” (Dostum 2014b), he has 
his stronghold in Northern Afghanistan and, like many warlords, looks back at a history of com-
plicated and often shifting alliances. Dostum fought against the Soviets, supported the pro-soviet 
Najibullah-Regime and participated in the coup against Najibullah. In 1991 Dostum founded the 
National Islamic Movement (Junbush-e Melli-e Islami) party, aiming at a decentralized but unit-
ed Afghanistan. During the civil war he fought Hekmatyar alongside Ahmad Shah Massoud, and 
Ahmad Shah Massoud alongside Hekmatyar. In 1996 he co-founded the Northern Alliance to 
fight the Taliban, but left for Turkey after his defeat in 1997. After his return to Afghanistan in 
2001 he was aligned with the US in the fight against the Taliban. In the new government Karzai 
appointed him Deputy Defense Minister. In 2004 Dostum ran for president (10%) and in 2009 he 
supported Karzai. On his website he writes, “My greatest accomplishment is representing my 
countrymen in always working for a free, democratic Afghanistan,” and, “I think that in Afghani-
stan’s long violent history, my role of the largest single military entity has been engaged in war-
fare, but my use of the military has resulted in peaceful resolution of disputes” (Dostum 2014a,c). 
BBC characterizes him quite differently: “General Dostum grew rich, but his rule was harsh. He is 
reported to have frequently ordered public executions of criminals, who were usually crushed to 
death under tanks” (BBC News South Asia 2001). The second vice president is Sarvar Danish, 
member of the fragmented Hazara Unity Party (Hezb-e Wahdat). Educated in Iraq, Syria and 
Iran, he has degrees in Islamic Law, Journalism and Islamic Culture and Education. He was the 
first governor of the province Daikundi and Minister of Justice (2004–2010) and Minister of 
Higher Education (2010–2014) under Karzai. 
CEO Abdullah Abdullah (45% in the first round of elections, 44% in the run-off) has a Tajik 
mother and a Pashtun father and grew up and studied in Kabul. After fleeing to Pakistan in 1982, 
he soon returned to Afghanistan and joined Ahmad Shah Massoud in the North as “Head of the 
Health Department of Panjshir Resistance Front” (Tolo News 2014). He was a member of the 
Islamic Society (Jamiat-e Islami) party, which joined the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in 
1996. In 1999 he was appointed Foreign Minister of the United Front, a position he held under 
Karzai until 2005. Abdullah Abdullah was a candidate in the 2009 presidential elections, but 
withdrew his candidacy in the run-off against Karzai. As the founder of the Coalition for Change 
and Hope he came to be the leader of the Afghan opposition. His 2014 candidacy was supported 
and financed by the warlord and governor of Balkh, Atta Mohammad Noor (Böge 2014). Anoth-
er supporter is Amrullah Saleh, former head of the Afghan intelligence service National Direc-
torate of Security (NDS). He founded the National Movement (Basje-e Melli) and is strictly op-
posed to reconciliation with the Taliban. Abdullah’s involvement in the Mujahideen movement 
goes along with acceptance within Afghan society, but also brings “a lot of patch-work, reconcili-
ation and a lot of facing up to criticisms, which could in turn produce more bottom-up stabiliz-
ing effects if dealt with democratically and constitutionally” (Baryalay 2014). 
The Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Mohammad Khan, is a senior figure of the legal part of 
the Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami). During the war he had been deputy and head of Hezb-e 
Islami’s intelligence, but he does not give more information about his position and tasks. “It 
should be stressed that his name does not appear in any of the reporting on war crimes commit-
ted between 1978 and 2001. Moreover, ‘head of intelligence’ does not necessarily mean he had 
real power or command responsibility” (Clark 2014a). Mohammad Mohaqeq, the second Deputy 
Chief Executive Officer, a former member of the Hazara Unity Party (Hezb-e Wahdat), has 
founded the National Front of Afghanistan (Jabh-e Melli) with Ahmad Zia Massoud and 
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Abdulrashid Dostum (Vice President). They aimed at a decentralized “parliamentary form of 
democracy instead of a personality-centered Presidential system” (declaration as quoted in Ruttig 
2012). Mohaqeq had been Minister of Planning from 2001 to 2004. Nonetheless he supported 
Karzai in the 2009 presidential elections, to again break with him in 2010 because of Karzai’s 
reconciliation offer to the Taliban (Partlow 2010). 
Ashraf Ghani appointed Ahmad Zia Massoud as High Representative of the President for Re-
form and Governance (Office of the President of the IRoA 2014). This new position seems to be 
created for Massoud, “who had been due to get the CEO job himself, before stepping aside in the 
interests of national unity” (Clark 2014c). He was on a ticket with Zalmai Rassoul and is the 
chairman of the National Front of Afghanistan (Jabh-e Melli). Rassoul came in third in the first 
round of the elections (11%). He had resigned from the cabinet in order to be allowed to run as a 
candidate. After the first round, he decided to back Abdullah Abdullah in the run-off, probably 
for the pragmatic reason to have a good stand in the new government. One of his vice candidates 
was Habiba Sarabi, a member of the Truth and Justice Party. 
Hanif Atmar, former Minister of Interior, is National Security adviser. He quit his position on 
the Karzai government together with Mohammad Mohaqeq in 2010 because of his opposition to 
the reconciliation with the Taliban. He is a prominent member of the small Truth and Justice 
Party (Hezb-e Haq wa Edalat) that claims to be a “reformist” opposition party comparable to 
European Social Democrats (Ruttig 2011b). Abdul Salam Rahimi was appointed head of the Of-
fice of Administrative Affairs (OAA). Since Ghani dissolved the Presidential office in order to 
avoid double structures, Rahimi replaced not only Sadeq Modaber, former head of OAA, but also 
Abdul Karim Khoram, the president’s chief of staff under Karzai (Ruttig 2014). Rahimi is the 
founder of one of Afghanistan’s biggest NGOs, former member of the Human Rights Commis-
sion and since 2005 “head of one of Afghanistan’s largest media groups” (Clark 2014c) and for-
mer deputy finance minister. 
Even without considering other figures in the new government, it is evident that it includes a 
broad range of backgrounds, ideologies, and interests and it will be difficult to find a common 
agenda. One of the first actions in office of the new government was the signing of the Bilateral 
Security Agreement (BSA) and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) regulating the presence 
of American and international forces in Afghanistan for the next ten years. Two further points, 
decentralization and a reform of the election law, have been briefly addressed in the agreement of 
a Government of National Unity. Ashraf Ghani offered peace negotiations to the Taliban and 
other militant groups (BBC News Asia 2014). However, the positions of other members of the 
government concerning this topic are unclear and his efforts quickly met resistance. Analyzing 
Abdullah Abdullah’s ticket, Kate Clark stated: “The alliance, if it holds, could possibly heal one of 
the most bitter and deadly of enmities of the last few decades” (Clark 2014a). On an even higher 
level, the same can be said for this new government. At the same point, this also points to what 
might turn out to be the new government’s key weakness: The fact that it integrates so many 
different actors may make it difficult for it to take a clear stand on hotly contested issues, essen-
tially preventing the Afghan government from embracing an active, assertive role in peace talks 
with the insurgency.  
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2.2 Afghan warlords 
Key figures Abdulrashid Dostum, Ismail Khan, Atta Mohammad Noor, Karim Khalili, Mohammad Mohaqeq, Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf, Gul Agha Sherzai 
Divisions Ethnic, religious, political, and regional cleavages
Strong ties Afghan government, USA, NATO
Notable ties 
Iran (Hazara warlords and Ismail Khan); Turkey and Uzbekistan (Abdulrashid 
Dostum); Saudi Arabia (Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf and others); USA, CIA (pro-Western 
and pro-government warlords)
Armed opponents IEA, HQN, HIG
Rivals Internal rivalry; Afghan Civil Society
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Maintain control over their areas of influence; prevent punishment for war crimes 
and other human rights abuses; secure influx of international resources; establish 
security and prosperity in their strongholds; manage political influence within Afghan 
government without giving up own military and political power; prevent return of the 
Taliban to Kabul
Afghan warlordism is “first and foremost explained by the strong demand for security by the 
population, especially in the villages” (Giustozzi 2003: 4). A warlord can be defined as a ruler 
“whose basic characteristics are his independence from any higher authority and his control of a 
‘private army,’ which responds to him personally. [...] Less essential, but still important character-
istics are that his power is overwhelmingly based on military strength and/or charisma and that 
he lacks full ‘legitimacy’ among the civilian population of the area that he controls.” (Giustozzi 
2003: 2)  
The most prominent Afghan warlords share the history of Jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s. 
Financial and material help from the US, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran as well as the control 
over opium economy “allowed the commanders to take authority away from traditional tribal 
elders and become the de facto governors of the districts they dominated, since they provided 
both security and jobs” (Marten 2007: 55). After having expelled the Red Army, the victorious 
Mujahideen then turned against each other and Afghanistan slid into a bloody civil war. The 
resulting anarchy paved the way for the success of the Taliban, who established their Islamic 
Emirate and their rigid interpretation of Islamic law in 1996. In 2001, in order to overthrow the 
Taliban, the US and its allies relied on the warlords, who returned from exile to claim back their 
traditional areas of influence that the Taliban had stripped them of. Various other external actors 
maintain close ties with specific warlords and continue to support them financially, depending 
on political and religious preferences as well as economic motivations. While the term “warlord” 
commonly refers to non-state actors, most (former) Afghan warlords have been included in the 
political system. After 2001 they “expected and received senior positions in the new administrati-
on” (Mac Ginty 2010: 588). 
Abdulrashid Dostum is one of the strongest warlords in the Government of National Unity. 
Others have been appointed governors in their strongholds and “have proven quite successful in 
areas ranging from security and reconstruction to counternarcotics” (Mukhopadhyay 2009: 1), 
even though they are accused of war crimes and other human rights violations. Atta Mohammad 
Noor, the Governor of Balkh, has been supporting Abdullah Abdullah throughout the election 
process and could be accountable for the pressure on the presidential candidate not to accept 
election results that might favor Ashraf Ghani (Böge 2014). Noor declared that he would con-
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tinue to support Abdullah, while Ghani announced his intention to combat parallel structures to 
the government, indirectly referring to Noor (Ahmadiar 2014). Still others control only a small 
number of troops and act within their rural district (Marten 2007: 58). 
Overall, as Antonio Giustozzi puts it, “these warlords are more akin to politicians than to 
businessmen, in that what they are looking for is power rather than money as an end in itself” 
(Giustozzi 2003: 3). Hence, warlords in Afghanistan should not be seen exclusively as a “coun-
terweight to the state” (Schetter et al. 2007: 138), but as a broad variety of strongmen with differ-
ent backgrounds, interests, and resources. Since many Afghans demand that war criminals 
should be brought to justice, the extensive inclusion of warlords into the government has nega-
tive effects on the legitimacy of the central government (Merkel 2014: 21–22). 
With 7%, the Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf ticket was the fourth most popular in the first round of 
the elections. Human Rights Watch accuses him of severe war crimes and crimes against human-
ity (HRW 2005: 112–114). Furthermore, he “became so revered within al-Qaeda circles that an 
affiliate group in the southern Philippines derived its name from his” (Joscelyn 2014: 24). Sayyaf 
is the leader of the Organization of the Islamic Call (Tanzim-e Dahvat-e Islami), a party “alleged-
ly receiving funding from fellow Salafis in the Middle East” (ICG 2013: 4). Sayyaf had been a 
Karzai ally. On his ticket was the religious conservative Ismail Khan, former governor of Herat 
and one of the most famous Afghan warlords. 
2.3 Afghan civil society 
Groups 
ACSFo (umbrella organization), other NGOs such as ANCB, AWN, CSHRN, and 
FCCS; the CDCs; media and independent journalists; but also traditional institutions 
such as local jirgas and shuras
Notable ties UNAMA, USAID, foreign NGOs
Rivals IEA, Afghan Warlords
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Mediate between Afghan society and government; ensure “inclusiveness” of any 
political settlement between insurgency and government; review the role of the HPC; 
conduct any peace process under the leadership of a neutral mediator; strengthen “a 
regional and long-term approach,” strengthen the rule of law; fight corruption; 
strengthen “transparency and accountability” (Afghan Civil Society Actors 2013); 
protect democratic rights, women’s rights, and civil liberties
While the term “civil society” has emerged in Afghanistan within the last decade in order to de-
scribe specific actors, there is no consensus about what it exactly captures (Winter 2010: 7). On 
one hand, traditional institutions such as jirgas and shuras as well as religious authorities could 
be considered part of the Afghan civil society. On the other hand, a number of organizations that 
have been founded since 2001 are more commonly referred to as official representatives of civil 
society. In addition, the term “civil society” is used to refer to the overall population in contrast to 
power-holders and political elites. 
Most NGOs are organized within networks such as the Afghan Civil Society Forum-
organization (ACSFo): With more than 140 member organizations, the Forum’s main activities 
include “coordination, civic education, advocacy, media, capacity building, peace building, re-
search and consultations” (ACSFo 2012: 3). The range of CSOs is broad and includes organi-
zations such as the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), as well as the Afghan Analysts Network 
(AAN), other research institutions, and the Afghan Chamber of Commerce & Industries (ACCI) 
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(AREU 2014: 49–69). Out of the more than 3,000 NGOs operating in Afghanistan “only a small 
number are foreign-based” (Novak 2013: 884). Yet most founders of Afghan NGOs had been 
working with international organizations before and the influence of international donors is 
significant (Novak 2013: 878; Winter 2010: 30). 
When it comes to those people not holding positions of power in government, opposition, 
warlord militias, or insurgent groups, research suggests that people “feel that politics and gov-
ernment are imbued with ethnic division, that they have experienced discrimination on the basis 
of their ethnicity and that this has been exacerbated by both the Afghan Government and the 
international community” (Winter 2010: 9). Therefore, many Afghans want civil society actors to 
mediate between society and government in order to secure the inclusion of “the men, women 
and young people” in the decision-making-process (ACSFo 2014: 43). 
Decades of civil war have taken a heavy toll on the Afghan people: From 2001 to 2013, be-
tween 12,000 and 43,500 Afghan civilians have died in the war. Including the deaths of interna-
tional and Afghan security forces, insurgents, journalists, and NGO workers, estimates vary 
widely from 30,000 to (less likely) figures as high as 100,000. Opinion polls suggest that “Afghans 
identify insecurity (30%), corruption (26%), unemployment (25%), and the economy (10%) as 
the top four problems currently facing Afghanistan as a whole” (Asia Foundation 2013: 6). Ac-
cordingly, civil society actors are expected to support the government in these fields, in human 
and women’s rights, in education and in supervising the reconciliation process (ACSFo 2014: 42–
43). 
Polls also suggest that a slight majority of Afghans see their country moving in the right direc-
tion (Asia Foundation 2012: 5), and state that “their families are more prosperous today than 
they were during the Taliban era” (Asia Foundation 2012: 14). At the same time, research con-
ducted among households in the rural areas of Badakhshan, Kandahar, and Sar-i-Pul 
“found that while many have experienced improvements in access to basic services since 2002, 
livelihood security […] has declined for the majority. Changes outside of their control, including 
drought, the ban on opium poppy cultivation and rising global food prices, led to large decreases 
in agricultural production or threatened food security.” (Kantor/Pain 2011: 1) 
Polls and qualitative research also indicate significant differences between the Afghan provinces 
as well as a notable rural/urban divide when it comes to political preferences. People from the 
cities tend to be more liberal, while inhabitants of rural areas tend to be more conservative. This 
cleavage can be traced back to the century-old history of the silk road which integrated the Afg-
han cities in a “cosmopolitan trade network” and left the rural provinces untouched (Schetter 
2004: 12). 
While the insurgency is very unpopular in the eyes of the Afghans – two thirds have no sym-
pathies for these groups at all – “there is a high level of public awareness (74%) of the govern-
ment’s attempts at reconciliation with AOGs [armed opposition groups], and a majority of Af-
ghans (63%) say that these efforts can help stabilize the country” (Asia Foudation 2013: 7). In the 
context of civil society and the reconciliation process, the role of traditional structures such as 
jirgas and shuras is widely discussed. Scholars argue that “taking into account the political cul-
ture” (Roy 2005: 1010) is necessary to build a stable political environment. Jirgas and shuras re-
solve conflicts on the basis of customary law, “administered by a body of village elders with estab-
lished social status and reputation for piety and fairness” (Wang 2014: 216). They work on the 
side of the official courts and are particularly relevant in rural regions with a lack of access to 
and/or trust of state institutions. These mechanisms can facilitate reconciliation processes with-
out a loss of dignity for all involved parties (Semple 2009: 14). That traditional structures can be 
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included in an official decision making process became evident with the role of the Loya Jirga in 
the development of the new constitution of Afghanistan. 
3. Afghan insurgency 
The Afghan insurgency is not a coherent actor but consists of different armed groups with dis-
tinct goals and different ties with non-Afghan actors. 
The dominant group is the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan,” the Afghan Taliban. In terms of 
followers, supporters, and revenue (Giustozzi 2010: 4), the Islamic Emirate is the most important 
and most influential faction of the insurgency, though it also consists of different networks. The 
two other most notable actors are the Haqqani network which is allied with the Taliban, and the 
Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami) led by the Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 
3.1 Afghan Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, IEA) 
Key figure Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, “Commander of the Faithful” 
Divisions 
Supreme Shura; four regional military shuras in Quetta, Peshawar, Miran Shah, and 
Gerdi Jangal; several committees such as the political committee and the military 
committee; different networks such as the Kandahari Taliban, the Tora Bora Jihad 
Front, and smaller Salafi groups
Strong ties HQN, IMU 
Notable ties 
ISI; Iranian Revolutionary Guards; donors from the Arab states of the Persian Gulf; 
TTP; other militant Islamists such as LeT, Jundallah, LeJ; HIG (occasionally); al-
Qaeda 
Armed opponents RSM, OFS, NATO, ANSF, Afghan government, Afghan Warlords 
Rivals HIG; internal rivalry between different networks; Afghan Civil Society 
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Removal of foreign soldiers from Afghan soil; “security for themselves, neutralizing 
the international and Afghan threat to them and ending the targeting of their 
leaders and families, international recognition as a legitimate political actor, 
removal of key leaders from UN terrorist lists, and release of prisoners, […] purge 
of corrupt government leaders and prosecuting or exiling unfriendly warlords” 
(Pickering 2011: 29–30); “law and order, especially as enforced by ulema (Islamic 
scholars) against criminals; application of sharia, involving harsher punishments 
and changes to the Afghan constitution; legitimate exercise of power or Islamic 
government; conformity with perceived Islamic social rules, involving further 
constraints on women; political, but possibly not administrative, power; […] peace 
and security” (Waldman 2010: 1); emancipation from the ISI
The Taliban can be defined as “all those who acknowledge the leadership of Mullah Omar [now 
deceased, followed by Mullah Mansour in 2015, A.B.] and of the Leadership Shura and who in 
turn are acknowledged by the leadership as members of the movement” (Giustozzi 2012b: 5). 
Still, each commander works within his own social network (Semple 2009: 33) The first genera-
tion of the Taliban “grew from the Pashtun refugee camps, mostly in Pakistan, where a modified 
and selectively interpreted version of Wahabist Islam influenced some madrassa students (talib) 
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to adopt an ultraconservative approach to social issues and politics.” (Afsar, Samples, Wood 
2008: 60) They put an end to the civil war between the various Mujahideen factions that had ap-
peared after the withdrawal of the Red Army from Afghanistan and enforced “graveyard peace” 
in large parts of Afghanistan when they officially established their Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
in 1996. They ruled until 2001, though they were unable to establish full control over all parts of 
the country. 
Then, in the eyes of the Taliban, “the West invaded Afghanistan to prevent Islamic stability, to 
wipe out the nation’s Islamic and religious values and norms, to divert the future generation 
from Islam, and to forever subjugate, occupy and secularize the Afghan Mujahid nation” (IEA 
2013). Consequently, while formally ousted from power, the Taliban did not accept defeat and 
were “determined to regroup, reorganize, and fight again. They have done so to surprising effect, 
with apparent support from some in the Pakistani intelligence services” (Brahimi/Pickering 2011: 
21). The Taliban claim not to have a global agenda. They have targeted American and NATO 
forces on Afghan soil, but have so far restrained from committing terrorist attacks against the US 
or other NATO countries. In comparison with other militant Islamists, the IEA is thus more of a 
national insurgency than a transnational terrorist movement. The Taliban declared a “two stage 
war: first, to expel foreigners; secondly, to change the government” (International Crisis Group 
2014: 30) in order to resist the perceived invading infidel forces that threaten Afghan and Islamic 
values and culture (Waldman 2010: 3–4) and to establish a truly Islamic order. On their website, 
the IEA declared it would not recognize the new president, since the elections were heavily influ-
enced by the Americans (IEA 2014b) and the new administration would thus be as much a “pup-
pet regime” as the Karzai government. The variety of motives to join the Taliban is as heteroge-
neous as the network itself. Some research points to ideological or religious reasons (Broschk 
2011: 82–83), while other studies highlight economic motives as well as reaction to the harsh 
treatment by international and Afghan security forces (International Crisis Group 2014: 20, 26, 
33). Yet, “for many people being associated with the Taliban is indeed about belonging to a net-
work as opposed to actively participating in an armed struggle” (Semple 2009: 35). The radicali-
zation seems to take place only after the recruitment (Broschk 2011: 86). 
Organizationally, the Taliban are a decentralized actor which is composed of different net-
works: “The predominant mode of organization used by the Taliban is personal networks, 
formed around charismatic leaders” (Giustozzi 2010: 5). The supreme council called rahbari 
shura gives advice to the Taliban leader, the “Commander of the Faithful”. Approximately ten 
ministry-like shuras, special commissions, and a military council are subordinated to the su-
preme council. With similar structures on regional, provincial, and district level, the IEA theoret-
ically controls a complete shadow government (Ruttig 2011c : 45–49). In reality, not only the 
strength of the affiliated regional networks, such as the Peshawar Shura or the Haqqani Network, 
but also of the huge amount of local networks differs significantly. Most of the Taliban are “part-
time fighters” (International Crisis Group 2014: 8), have no political, ideological, or religious 
education and therefore have a widely pragmatic approach (Johnson 2012: 82). 
Mullah Omar reportedly avoided “siding too closely with any particular network” (Giustozzi 
2009: 5). His successor, Mullah Mansour, will face the same challenge. He will have to carefully 
manage intra-Taliban negotiations in order not to alienate the moderates or the more radical 
factions, as well as to protect the integrity of the Islamic Emirate. A key figure within the more 
radical wing of the Taliban is the young Mullah Zakir who only recently has been replaced by 
Ibrahim Sadar as the Taliban’s military leader. Zakir had reportedly been objected to peace nego-
tiations, while Mullah Mansour was said to have had a more open attitude during his time as 
Mullah Omar’s deputy. He supposedly supported the opening of the Taliban political office in 
Qatar as well as the participation of some Taliban members in unofficial talks organized by the 
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Pugwash Conference. However, it remains to be seen how he can reconcile the need to establish 
authority and credibility within the Islamic Emirate with attempts to negotiate with the Afghan 
government which is officially denounced as pro-American. A hotly debated issue within the 
Taliban is not simply the question if one should negotiate, but also how one should negotiate, 
most notably to what extend the movement should rely on Pakistani support. 
Overall, there are reasons to believe that the Taliban leadership is willing to compromise as 
part of larger peace agreement: They 
“have been living in exile for over a decade, their children are growing up as Pakistanis, and their 
movements are surely watched and constrained by their Pakistani patrons. […] they live under 
the constant threat of assassination by U.S. drones or commando raids […] And the war imposes 
costs on the Taliban, too. […] Stalemate is costly enough that the Taliban might consider an offer 
if the process is not tantamount to capitulation.” (Biddle 2013: 9) 
The Taliban leadership announced the IEA would enter negotiations, on the condition that in-
ternational forces withdraw from Afghanistan, especially from Kandahar, Helmand and 
Shindand, nevertheless not all affiliated networks agree here (Giustozzi 2014: 17–18) and many 
say, the Taliban will test their chances as soon as international forces withdraw. Radical groups, 
such as the Mahaz-e Fedayeen declared they would continue to fight at any means (International 
Crisis Group 2014: 5-6). 
While most Afghans agree that the legal system should be based on the Sharia, the Taliban have 
“increasingly encountered sharp resistance from the population when they have sought to re-
impose the stern morality code of emirate days” in areas under their control (Brahimi/Pickering 
2011: 23). This resistance has forced the Taliban to rethink their positions on issues such as educa-
tion for girls and the notorious ban on music, which turned out to be so unpopular that Mullah 
Omar “issued a fatwa giving local field commanders discretion on enforcing the emirate’s social 
edicts – and most have opted for a relatively relaxed attitude” (Brahimi/Pickering 2011: 23). While 
the Taliban claim not to have an ethnic agenda, “there is no question that Pashtuns account for the 
overwhelming majority of the Taliban’s ranks. [...] At the same time, however, it is clear that the 
Taliban have at least since 2006 carried out intense efforts to mobilize support among non-
Pashtuns, with at least some success from 2008 onward” (Giustozzi 2012b: 58). 
3.2 Haqqani Network (HQN) 
Key figure Sirajuddin Haqqani
Strong ties IEA, TTP, al-Qaeda
Notable ties Other militant Islamist groups, ISI
Armed opponents RSM, OFS, ANSF, Afghan government, Afghan Warlords, Army of Pakistan, Army of India 
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Maintain position as hub between various militant Islamist groups; “maintain its 
autonomy and influence in Loya Paktia and North Waziristan” (Rassler/Brown 2011: 
15) instead of seeking power in Kabul; support global Jihad while avoiding being 
openly associated with al-Qaeda or attacks against Pakistan
The Haqqani network is an Afghan-Pakistani insurgent group with a unique function in the net-
work of militant Islamism. The HQN was founded by Jalaluddin Haqqani who served as its lead-
er until his death in 2015. Haqqani fought as a U.S. ally against the Soviets and joined the Taliban 
government as Minister of Tribal Affairs in the mid-90s (Katzman 2014a: 15–16). Today, the 
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HQN counts around several thousand fighters and serves as a hub between various Islamist 
groups by enhancing the transfer and exchange of material and ideological resources for the 
cause of transnational Jihad. 
The strongholds of the HQN are the Afghan provinces of Khost, Paktia, and Paktika, as well 
as Pakistan’s North Waziristan (Rassler/Brown 2011: 8). This strategically relevant location has 
enabled the HQN to function as the “primary conduit” (Rassler/Brown 2011: 5), helping many 
TTP fighters to access the war in Afghanistan, and to act as an “important regional platform for 
the [Afghan] Taliban to project power and influence in Southeastern Afghanistan” 
(Rassler/Brown 2011: 12). At the same time, analysts claim that the HQN has ties with the Paki-
stani ISI, and that Pakistan stated that it could “‘deliver’ the Haqqani network and reconcile it 
with President Karzai’s Afghan government” (Rassler/Brown 2011: 50). The HQN finances its 
activities “through licit and illicit businesses in Pakistan and the Persian Gulf and in controlling 
parts of Khost Province” (Katzman 2014a: 16). While the HQN “has carefully avoided any direct 
association with international terrorism or the targeting of Westerners outside of Afghanistan,” 
(Rassler/Brown 2011: 49) it has been associated with attacks against Afghan, Pakistani, and Indi-
an targets, and has close operational ties with TTP and al-Qaeda (Rassler/Brown 2011: 16). After 
the death of Jalaluddin Haqqani the HQN is run by his son, Sirajuddin Haqqani, who also is a 
member of the leadership of the IEA, which illustrates the tight links between the Haqqani net-
work and the Afghan Taliban. 
3.3 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Islamic Party (HIG) 
Key figure Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Notable ties IEA (occasionally)
Armed opponents RSM, OFS, ANSF, IEA (occasionally)
Rivals IEA, Afghan Warlords
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Remove US and NATO forces from Afghan soil; replace the Afghan constitution with 
a more “Islamic” version; ensure survival of the HIG; sign a deal with the Afghan 
government; prepare HIG for political role following such an agreement 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is one of the most prominent and illustrious figures in Afghan politics. 
Relying on generous financial support by the USA, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, he fought against 
the Red Army in the 1980s, was briefly Prime Minister of Afghanistan in the early 1990s, and fled 
to Iran when the Taliban rose to power. Since 2001, his Islamic Party (Hezb-e Islami; or Hezb-e 
Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) is waging a guerilla war against US and NATO forces. 
Within the last decades, Hekmatyar has shifted his alliances so often that “in the view of many 
who have dealt with him, Hekmatyar has a proven record in breaking commitments” 
(Brahimi/Pickering 2011: 60). Consequently, the relationship between his HIG and the Taliban 
“can often be turbulent, as in this case: Hizb-i Islami and Taliban often fight each other in local 
context, while cooperating in others” (Giustozzi 2010: 6). In contrast to the Taliban, Hekmatyar 
has publicly and repeatedly announced his willingness to enter into formal negotiations with the 
Afghan government. He has authored dozens of books and a proposal for a renewed Afghan 
constitution. Some of his followers have registered a wing of the Islamic Party with the Afghan 
authorities and they have won seats in the Afghan parliament. The fact that Hekmatyar told his 
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followers to vote in the 2014 Afghan presidential elections was “widely interpreted as an attempt 
to position HIG for a future political role” (Katzman 2014a: 15). 
4. International actors in Afghanistan 
While the US-led invasion of Afghanistan was originally aimed at destroying al-Qaeda and oust-
ing the Taliban from power, the mission evolved into multilateral nation-building that was met 
with increasing resistance by an armed insurgency. Though the American military presence has 
been significantly reduced with the withdrawal of ISAF, the US remains one of the key interna-
tional actors that would play a role in any kind of negotiated settlement between the Afghan gov-
ernment and the insurgency. Other prominent international actors to consider in negotiations 
are NATO and the United Nations. 
4.1 United States of America (USA) 
Key figure President Barack Obama
Factions White House, Congress, Pentagon, State Department, Republicans, Democrats 
Subordinated CIA, OFS 
Memberships NATO, CICA (Observer)
Strong ties NATO, Afghan government, Afghan Warlords, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Pakistan, India, Turkey
Notable ties Jundallah 
Armed opponents Al-Qaeda, IEA, HQN, HIG, TTP
Rivals Iran, Russia, China
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
“Preventing the resurgence of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan; assisting a reasonable 
stable, friendly, autonomous Afghanistan; preventing further Afghan violence from 
destabilizing Pakistan; preserving democratic and human rights in Afghanistan; 
continuing credibility for NATO; reducing illicit drug trade” (Pickering 2011: 30) 
The Bush administration  
“was never able to reconcile the tensions between countering terrorism and promoting democra-
cy. […] As such, when the Obama administration inherited the Afghanistan campaign, the situa-
tion was worse than that which had been seen at the start of the war. This has resulted in the 
Obama administration abandoning the notion of democracy promotion in favour of transferring 
power as quickly as possible to an illegitimate Afghan government”. (Hassan/Hammond 2011: 
532) 
Critics argue that a “flawed state-building process,” “unfavourable ‘allies’ and misjudgment of the 
Taliban,” combined with a “flawed counter-insurgency and an inconclusive ‘surge’” as well as a 
“lack of a political strategy and dependence on Afghan forces” (Waldman 2013) eventually led to 
the failure of US attempts to rebuild Afghanistan and defeat the insurgency. 
Today, Afghanistan does not rank prominently on the political agenda in the US. Polarized 
debates about domestic issues, such as health care and the economy, are of much higher rele-
vance, and the public has the general impression that America’s war in Afghanistan is coming to 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 19
 
 
an end. Political observers point out that the US has only two main objectives in Afghanistan: 
“that Afghanistan not become a base for terrorism against the West, and that chaos in Afghani-
stan not destabilize its neighbors, especially Pakistan” (Biddle 2013: 4). At the same time, negotia-
tions with the insurgency are unpopular: 
“Many U.S. conservatives doubt the Administration’s motives in the talks, fearing giveaways to 
cover an Administration rush to the exits and worrying that negotiation signals weakness. Amer-
ican progressives fear the loss of hard-won gains for Afghan women and minorities in conces-
sions to the Taliban.” (Biddle 2013: 8) 
In spite of the decreasing lack of interest in the conflict, the US will remain a key player in Afgha-
nistan, since the ANSF heavily rely on ongoing US support in their war against the insurgency. 
Also, the recent advances of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have made Washington 
aware of the risk of dramatic Taliban gains from 2015 on, in addition to ISIS establishing an “Af-
ghanistan branch.” The first US anti-terror operation in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Free-
dom (OEF), has ended in 2014. The follow-up mission is Operation Freedom’s Sentinel (OFS), 
which is part of NATO’s new Resolute Support Mission (RSM). 
4.2 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
Key figures Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and General John F. Campbell, Commander Resolute Support and US Forces Afghanistan
Subordinated Resolute Support Mission (RSM)
Member states 
Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, USA
Strong ties Afghan government, Afghan Warlords, OFS
Notable ties UN, India 
Armed opponents IEA, HQN, HIG 
Rivals Russia, China, Iran
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests Maintain stability and security in Afghanistan; support Afghan government and ANSF; demonstrate own relevance and capabilities
While NATO invoked Article 5 of its charter after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and while NATO 
members joined the US in its “Operation Enduring Freedom” (OEF) against al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban, it was not until 2003 that NATO officially assumed leadership of the International Secu-
rity Assistance Force (ISAF) that had been established by the UN Security Council. ISAF was 
operating under a UN Chapter VII mandate that has been extended by the UNSC on an annual 
basis. ISAF represented “NATO’s first significant out-of-area deployment” and was “viewed by 
many observers as a key test for the Alliance – a measure of both its current capabilities and its 
possible future relevance” (Dale 2011: 22). 
While the intensity of the armed conflict was relatively low until 2005, in 2008 U.S. Army 
General David McKiernan acknowledged that the situation had escalated: “We are at war in Af-
ghanistan. It’s not peacekeeping. It’s not stability operations. It’s not humanitarian assistance. It’s 
war” (quoted in Bowman/Dale 2009: 14). In order to deal with the growing insurgency, ISAF 
enacted “a greater resourced, population-centric counterinsurgency strategy” (Brand 2011: vii) 
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that relied on “integrated, population-centric approaches that engage traditional local political 
authorities, civil society, and a wide range of religious actors” instead of “militarized strategies 
focused on killing the enemy” (Bruton 2009: 81). The number of NATO troops in Afghanistan 
(ISAF and OEF combined) peaked at more than 150,000. The idea was that the “surge” would 
significantly weaken the insurgency in order to allow a smooth transition to the ANSF by the end 
of the ISAF mission in 2014. However, “this has not happened. Tight deadlines for U.S. with-
drawal combined with Taliban resilience have left insurgents in control of enough critical terrain 
to remain a threat well after 2014” (Biddle 2013: 6). With the end of ISAF in 2014, NATO sup-
port for the ANSF in the form of training, advice, and assistance continues as part of the new 
Resolute Support Mission (RSM) which counts approximately 12,000 personnel. 
4.3 United Nations (UN) 
Key figure Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and Head of UNAMA Ján Kubiš 
Subordinated UNAMA, UNSC, UNGA, UNHRC, UNICEF, UNODC, WHO, UNESCO 
Cooperates with NATO, RSM, OFS, Afghan government, ADB, World Bank, ICRC, OIC, Istanbul Process, CICA 
Armed opponents IEA, HQN, HIG, TTP
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Support a peaceful security transition from NATO to the Afghan government 
(Margesson 2010); promote “accelerated Afghan leadership and ownership, 
strengthened international partnership and regional cooperation, improved Afghan 
governance, enhanced capabilities of Afghan security forces, economic growth and 
better protection for the rights of all Afghan citizens” (UNSC 2014: 1) 
The UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a special political mission led by the 
UN which was established by the UNSC in 2002 following the 2001 Bonn Conference. Although 
UNAMA “has built a fair amount of credibility with the Afghan public with its outreach to civil 
society” (Brahimi/Pickering 2011: 57), some observers argue it lacks a political basis for peace, a 
suitable mandate, and the resources necessary for the mandate’s implementation (Chesterman 
2002: 39). UNAMA supported the election process in Afghanistan with “technical and financial 
assistance to the electoral bodies” and promoted “local dialogue and peace initiatives” in 12 prov-
inces (UN 2014: 4–5). More than 20 UN agencies are currently working in Afghanistan. They 
focus mostly on advising the relevant ministries and establishing and supporting training pro-
grams. UN Security Council resolutions on Afghanistan stress the importance of a reconciliation 
process and a “dialogue for all those who renounce violence, [and] have no links to international 
terrorist organizations” (UNSC 2014: 3). UNAMA has repeatedly called on Afghan government, 
insurgency, and NATO and US forces to protect civilians from harm and to fulfill their obliga-
tions under international humanitarian law. 
The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan does not perceive the UN as a neutral actor, but one con-
trolled by the US. It profoundly disagrees with official UN statistics according to which the insur-
gency is responsible for three quarters of all civilian deaths and injuries, and claim that UNAMA 
reports on civilian casualties are “directly produced by the US embassy and then published under 
the name of [the] United Nations” (IEA 2014a). 
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5. Militant Islamist movements in Pakistan 
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, which border Afghanistan, are 
“home to over roughly 45,000 militants and forty militant groups” (Qazi 2011: 1). Though they 
maintain various connections, their political goals are for the most part different. 
5.1 Pakistani Taliban (TTP) 
Key figures Emir Maulana Fazlullah and Naib Emir (Deputy) Khalid Haqqani 
Relevant divisions Strong local networks, Supreme Shura, various shuras
Strong ties HQN, LeI, LeJ, TNSM, HuJI, JeM, al-Qaeda
Notable ties IEA (in its war in Afghanistan)
Armed opponents Pakistani Army, ANSF, NATO, USA, OFS
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Strict enforcement of Islamic Law in Pakistan; removal of US and NATO forces from 
Afghanistan; end cooperation between Washington and Islamabad; prevent recognition 
of Durand line 
The Taliban Movement of Pakistan (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) is a network of various 
militant Islamists groups that united in 2007 to fight against the NATO forces in Afghanistan 
and against the Pakistani Army. Its origins can be traced back to the 1980s, when Pakistan and 
the USA 
“used the FATA as launching pads for sponsored mujahideen […]. The sprouting of madrassas, 
an abundance of modern weaponry, and an influx of Afghan refugees radicalized the environ-
ment. […] many foreign mujahideen (mostly Arabs) settled in the FATA and were absorbed into 
tribes through marriage. Due to ethnic, religious, ideological, and cultural affinities, the area’s 
residents viewed the Taliban’s rise favorably.” (Afsar/Samples/Wood 2008: 60) 
While the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was a substantial mobilizing factor for the TTP, “it 
was the Pakistan Army’s 2002 invasion of the tribal areas that transformed the existing 
widespread militancy into a full-blown insurgency” (Qazi 2011: 2). The TTP is ideologically less 
coherent than the IEA, different factions prioritize either the armed struggle in Afghanistan or in 
Pakistan, and followers are driven by a variety of motives, from local grievances and criminal 
activities to the involvement in drug trade. The TTP is also known for its opposition against 
foreign aid workers and believes that polio vaccinations conducted in Pakistani villages by the 
WHO are part of a Christian-Western conspiracy conducted in order to make Muslims impo-
tent. 
A key feature of the TTP is “their alliance with al-Qaeda, including personal relations dating 
back to the days of the Soviet-Afghan war” (Qazi 2011: 1). The TTP is associated with the failed 
terrorist attack on the New York Times Square in 2010, after which the US officially labeled the 
TTP a foreign terrorist organization. Faisal Shahzad, the “times square bomber,” justified his 
action as retribution for the US drone attacks in Pakistan. From 2004–2012, these CIA drone 
strikes killed “2,562–3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474–881 were civilians, including 176 
children” (Standford/NYU 2012: vi). While the IEA is believed to have moved away from al-
Qaeda within the last decade, “the Pakistani Taliban have moved in the opposite direction due to 
their alliance with al-Qaeda and other al-Qaeda aligned groups” (Qazi 2011: 9). 
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5.2 Al-Qaeda 
Key figure Ayman al-Zawahiri 
Relevant factions AQIM, HSM, EIJ, AQAP, Al-Nusra Front
Strong ties TTP, HQN, IMU, ETIM, LeT, HuJi, JeM, IJU; also: JI, ASG, MUJWA 
Notable ties IEA 
Armed opponents USA, ANSF, NATO, ISIS, Pakistan, India, Iran (and others)
Relevance of conflict High 
Key interests 
Liberate the Muslim World from American occupation; establish world-wide Islamic 
caliphate; overthrow governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the associated 
political orders 
According to the fatwa issued by Osama bin Laden (1957–2011), Ayman al-Zawahiri, and others 
in 1998, 
“The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilian and military – is an individual duty for 
every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the 
al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to 
move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim.” (as quoted in 
FAS 2014) 
Al-Qaeda’s ideology draws from Salafism and Wahabism as well as from the writings from 
Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), an Egyptian Islamic theorist. Al-Qaeda considers non-Sunni Muslims 
“infidels” and is responsible for sectarian violence; most victims of its terrorist attacks are of 
Muslim faith. 
13 years after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “U.S. officials put the number of al-Qaeda fighters in 
Afghanistan at between 50–100, who operate mostly in provinces of eastern Afghanistan such as 
Kunar” (Katzman 2014a: 13–14). However, al-Qaeda continues to maintain a presence and influ-
ence in the FATA, and it has strong ties with other militant Islamist groups. Factions of al-Qaeda 
also operate in Syria (Al-Nusra Front), Saudi Arabia and Yemen (AQAP), and Northern Africa 
(AQIM, HSM, EIJ). The head of the US Special Operations Command, Admiral William 
McRaven, said in early 2014 that “there is a threat of an Al-Qaeda resurgence in Afghanistan if all 
U.S. troops depart Afghanistan at the end of 2014” (Katzman 2014a: 13–14). However, with the 
declaration of an Islamic Caliphate by ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, an unprecedented stra-
tegic challenge has emerged for the al-Qaeda leadership. Al-Qaeda’s authority as the global leader 
of the Jihadist movement is seriously threatened which may have repercussions for the organiza-
tion’s activities in Afghanistan as well. In the Middle East, armed fighting erupted between ISIS 
and al-Qaeda, and similarly open clashes may erupt in Central Asia, where tensions between 
different Islamists group are common. 
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5.3 Other militant Islamist groups 
Key figures 
Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi (LeT), Fazlur Rehman Khalil (HuM), Masood Azhar (JeM), 
Maulana Fazlullah (former head of the TSNM, now leader of the TTP), Mangal Bagh 
(LeI), Abu Zar al-Burmi (IMU), Muhammad Dhahir Baluch (Jundallah), Hafiz Saeed 
Khan (LeT) 
Groups LeT, HuJi, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, HuM, JeM, LeJ, TNSM, LeI, IMU, ETIM, SSP, Jundallah, Jundallah (PRMI), ISIS, others
Notable ties 
Internal cooperation, as well as exchange with IEA, TTP, HQN, HIG (occasionally), 
and al-Qaeda, yet different degree of support; donors from the Arab States of the 
Persian Gulf 
Armed Opponents Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, China, USA, Uzbekistan, Iran, and others; depending on the group 
Rivals Internal rivalry due to political differences and personal disputes 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Enforcement of their strict interpretation of Islamic law; distinct political goals, 
ranging from separatist ambitions to support for the Afghan or Pakistani insurgency 
and to global Jihad
While the overall number and individual strength of the different militant Islamists groups is 
constantly changing, they share a conservative Sunni interpretation of Islamic law and the dis-
dain for non-Muslim interference in Muslim lands. Key issues are the US-led invasion of Af-
ghanistan as well as the Kashmir conflict between Pakistan and India. 
Perhaps the most prominent group besides the TTP is Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT, “Army of the 
Good”). Its main theatre of operation is the Kashmir valley, though it was also involved in the 
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks. It sees its struggle to liberate Kashmir from Indian occupation as 
part of a global Jihad. There are indicators that LeT funding can be traced back to sources in 
Saudia Arabia and that it maintains ties with the ISI. LeT has so far been focused on attacks 
against Indian targets, but is “said to be increasingly active inside Afghanistan” (Katzman 2014a: 
16). Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HuJi, “Movement for the Struggle of Islam”) has committed ter-
rorist attacks in Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan and aims to integrate Kashmir into Pakistan. 
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (“Party of the Mujahideen”) pursues the same goal and some believe it has 
ties with the ISI. Same can be said about Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Islami (HuM, “Movement of 
the Islamic Mujahideen”). Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM, “Army of Mohammad”) shares the sepa-
ratist agenda and is considered to be one of the most dangerous and radical organizations in the 
Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ, “Army of Jhangvi”) has been in-
volved in terrorist attacks against mostly Shia Muslims in Pakistan that have killed hundreds of 
civilians within the last years, and was also accused of “several attacks on Afghanistan’s Hazara 
Shiite community during 2011–2012” (Katzman 2014a: 16). LeJ is named after Haq Nawaz 
Jhangvi (1952–1990), a Sunni preacher who founded the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), another 
militant Islamist organization. The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM, “Move-
ment for the Enforcement of Islamic Law”) fights for the strict enforcement of Islamic Law in 
Pakistan and has significant influence in the Swat valley in Northern Pakistan. The former leader 
of the TNSM, Maulana Fazlullah, assumed leadership of the TTP when its previous leader was 
killed by a US drone strike in 2013. Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI, “Army of Islam”) is led by the illustri-
ous Islamist Mangal Bagh, who claims to be opposed to terrorist attacks (Zaidi 2008: 12), despite 
recently affiliating his network with the TTP after a previous split. 
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Other militant Islamist movements conduct their main operations in other theaters in the 
wider region, yet they maintain a presence in the FATA or have ties with Pakistani, Indian, or 
Afghan groups. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) aims to overthrow Islam Karimov 
in order to install a Muslim caliphate in Uzbekistan and is proud of its ties with the Afghan Tali-
ban. The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) aims to establish an independent state in the 
Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang and is accused by Beijing of acts of terrorism, extrem-
ism, and separatism. Finally, two organizations call themselves the “Soldiers of God.” The 
Jundallah of former TTP Emir Hakimullah Mehsud was involved in terrorist attacks in Pakistan. 
The Jundallah led by Muhammad Dhahir Baluch claims to fight for the interests of oppressed 
Sunni Muslims in mostly Shia Iran, while the Iranian government accuses Jundallah of terrorist 
activities and separatism. Observers believe that the Balochi Jundallah, also known as People’s 
Resistance Movement of Iran (PRMI), maintains ties with the ISI as well as with the CIA: “Amer-
ica is secretly funding militant ethnic separatist groups in Iran in an attempt to pile pressure on 
the Islamic regime to give up its nuclear programme” (Lowther/Freeman 2007). Finally, the Is-
lamic State (ISIS) recently claimed to have recruited a substantial number of followers in both 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Several other high-ranking TTP members declared allegiance with 
ISIS after they lost political power struggles within the Pakistani Taliban in 2014. While both the 
IMU and the Pakistani Jundallah pledged allegiance to ISIS, there are conflicting reports about 
the number of fighters from these groups that joined the “Islamic State,” as well as about the con-
sequences for the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Some members of the Afghan Taliban have 
distanced themselves from the most violent acts committed by ISIS. 
6. Regional powers 
The interests of several middle and regional powers clash in Central Asia. Russia and China 
compete for influence, Pakistan and India struggle with overlapping conflicts over establishing 
influence in Afghanistan, preventing the Afghan government from forging alliances with the 
other country, and also over the control of Kashmir. Iran and Saudi Arabia vie for religious lead-
ership. 
List of countries with GDP per capita, population, and GDP 
Regional Powers Central Asian States Gulf States Legend 
Pakistan $4,700 
199 M / $882 B 
Tajikistan $2,700 
8 M / $22 B 
Saudi Arabia $52,200 
28 M / $753 B 
Country GDP per capita 
Population / GDP 
India $5,900 
1,252 M / $7,376 B 
Uzbekistan $5,600 
29 M / $172 B 
UAE $64,500 
6 M / $600 B 
Afghanistan $1,900 
33 M / $61 B 
Iran $17,100 
82 M / $1,334 B 
Turkmenistan $14,200 
5 M / $82 B 
Qatar $143,400 
2 M / $321 B 
USA $54,600 
321 M / $17,420 B 
Turkey $19,600 
79 M / $1,508 B 
Kazakhstan $24,000 
18 M / $419 B 
M = million; B = billion. 
 
Population: July 2015 est.; GDP (PPP): 2014 est., data are in 2014 US 
dollars; GDP per capita (PPP): 2014 est., data are in 2013 US dollars. 
Saudi Arabia: immigrants make up more than 30% of the total popula-
tion, according to UN data (2013); UAE: the UN estimates the coun-
China $12,900 
1,367 M / $17,620 B 
Kyrgyzstan $3,400 
6 M / $19 B 
Russia $24,800 
142 M / $3,565 B 
try’s total population to be 9,445,624 as of mid-year 2014; immigrants make up more than 80% of the total 
population, according to 2013 UN data. Source: CIA World Factbook, cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook, accessed 27 Aug. 2015. 
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6.1 Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
Key figures President Mamnoun Hussain and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 
Relevant factions Political parties, ISI, Pakistan Army, SCOP
Memberships Istanbul Process, OIC, SCO (observer), Almaty Process (observer), CICA 
Strong ties USA, Saudi Arabia
Notable ties China, IEA and other militant groups (via ISI)
Armed opponents TTP; HQN; LeT; HuJi; JeM; other Islamist and separatist groups, such as BLA and BLF in Baluchistan
Rivals India 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
“Ensuring a neutral, stable Kabul government with the Afghan Taliban as a junior 
partner; supporting Afghan and U.S. operations against the Pakistan Taliban; 
withdrawing the United States and NATO in phases, but with continuing military 
and economic aid thereafter; limiting Indian influence, including effective checks on 
aid to the Baloch insurgency; expanding trade and investment in Afghanistan” 
(Pickering 2011: 30); preventing the creation of an independent “Pashtunistan;” 
recognition of the Afghan-Pakistani border (“Durand line”) by Kabul; accessing 
“Central Asia’s resources through Afghanistan” (ICG 2012)
Pakistan is arguably the country whose future is most intertwined with the conflict in Afghani-
stan. 
“Pakistan’s goal is that Afghanistan, at the very least, not align with rival India, and, at best, pro-
vide Pakistan strategic depth against India. Pakistan says India is using its embassy and four con-
sulates in Afghanistan (Pakistan says India has nine consulates) to recruit anti-Pakistan insur-
gents, and that India is using its aid programs only to build influence there.” (Katzman 2014a: 45) 
Thus, while Pakistan plays a key role in Afghanistan, Islamabad sees its “security interests in Af-
ghanistan primarily with reference to India. Emblematic of these is [also] the issue of Islamabad’s 
troubled region of Balochistan, where Pakistani officials allege India has been able to foment 
unrest by exploiting its enhanced role in Afghanistan” (Brahimi/Pickering 2011: 68). 
While Islamabad has officially stated that it is willing to participate in negotiations to end the 
conflict in Afghanistan, and while it has stated that it has means to guarantee the participation of 
the Afghan Taliban – thus indirectly admitting the dangerous ties between the ISI and the IEA – 
its foreign relations with Kabul are further “complicated by the continuing dispute over the Du-
rand Line, by the presence of Taliban safe havens in Pakistan, and by Pakistani perception of 
some senior Afghan officials’ hostility to Pakistan” (Pickering/Brahimi 2011: 11). Although a 
Taliban-led government, which would essentially be anti-India, would provide Pakistan with the 
required “strategic depth,” the Pakistani government is wary of “reverse strategic depth,” which 
would assist anti-Pakistan elements in finding a safe zone in Afghanistan. (Waldman/Wright 
2014: 7).  
Internally, Pakistan faces severe energy problems, political instability, a popular mistrust in 
the political elites, and terrorist and separatist activities. Since 9/11, Pakistan has “deployed over 
100,000 troops to different parts of the FATA” to fight the Taliban and their allies 
(Afsar/Samples/Wood 2008: 60). Observers note that with a population more than six times as 
large as Afghanistan’s, an economy more than ten times as big, and “an actual, existing, function-
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al nuclear arsenal, a failed Pakistan would be a much more dangerous sanctuary for al Qaeda” 
than Afghanistan (Biddle 2013: 5). 
With a multitude of internal problems, the Pakistani government doesn’t wish for an escalat-
ing civil war in Afghanistan as it would have negative ramifications in Pakistan. However, it 
doesn’t “necessarily favour a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan either, with some officials 
fearing that increased stability could lead to a greater Indian presence” (Waldman/Wright 2014: 
7). Although engaging in a cooperative relationship with the other regional powers and support-
ing peace negotiations and reconciliation would be advantageous to Pakistan in terms of promot-
ing and benefiting from trade with Afghanistan, water supply and narcotics trafficking, coopera-
tion is still perceived as “secondary to Pakistan’s national security interests” (Waldman/Wright 
2014: 7). However, recent pushes for intra-Afghan reconciliation made by China, Pakistan’s ally, 
may contribute to Islamabad embracing a more constructive attitude in a comprehensive peace 
process. 
6.2 Republic of India 
Key figures President Pranab Kumar Mukherjee and Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
Memberships Istanbul Process, SCO (observer), CICA 
Strong ties USA, Russia 
Notable ties Tajikistan, Afghan Civil Society, Afghan government, Qatar 
Armed opponents HuJi; Hizb-ul-Mujahideen; JeM, LeT 
Rivals China, Pakistan 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
“A friendly, or at least neutral, Afghanistan not dominated by the Taliban or other 
Pakistan proxies; eliminating al-Qaeda and other Islamic extremists who target 
India; preserving a presence in Afghanistan, including political and military 
intelligence capacities; expanding trade and investment, including transit routes 
through Pakistan; ensuring basic human rights in Afghanistan; strengthening 
growing strategic partnership with the United States” (Pickering 2011: 31) 
With a population of 1.2 billion people, India is the world’s largest democracy. Over the years the 
presence of India in Afghanistan has increased, albeit slowly. India is the “fifth-largest bilateral 
donor and engaging in a range of major infrastructure and capacity-building projects” (Destradi 
2014: 104). India sees its interest in the conflict primarily as it relates to Pakistan, which it seeks 
to prevent from realizing “strategic depth” in Afghanistan.  
India aims to “deny Pakistan the ability to block India from trade and other connections to 
Central Asia and beyond, and to prevent militants in Afghanistan from attacking Indian targets 
in Afghanistan” (Katzman 2014a: 49–50). India and Pakistan, as well as China, have fought sev-
eral wars over the disputed Kashmir region. (For more information on this conflict, see Köchler 
2008.) New Delhi is concerned that its interests in Afghanistan will be marginalized if the gov-
ernment is dominated by Pashtuns who it believes to be closer to Pakistan. It is very critical of 
talks with “moderate Taliban” because of “concerns over whether such a group really exists” 
(Price 2013: 5). Although India has often expressed its disapproval of negotiations with the Tali-
ban, isolation from the international community over this issue has pushed India to take a softer 
stance on peace talks.  
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 27
 
 
Cautious of provoking Pakistan with its engagement in Afghanistan, India is active in con-
tributing towards reconstruction, regional development, and economic cooperation. Its foreign 
aid to Afghanistan has both humanitarian and strategic motivations: 
“Most of India’s assistance has gone to traditional developmental projects such as training civil 
servants, constructing wells, power plants and transmission lines, and building and staffing hos-
pitals. Other projects have clear strategic functions: the construction of a road linking Afghani-
stan to the Iranian port of Chabahar, and the recent announcement that India would renovate the 
port itself, has created an alternative route for Indian goods to travel to Afghanistan” 
which sidelines Pakistan (Price 2013: 5). In the event that Pakistan doesn’t allow Indian goods to 
transit through its territory, partnership with Iran is of significance for India. Also, one of India’s 
crucial objectives in engaging in Afghanistan is to gain access to the vast energy reserves of Cent-
ral Asia: “The Iranian port of Chabahar and good relations with Iran are therefore high priorities 
for New Delhi: that route is the only realistic option for India to develop reliable commercial ties 
with Afghanistan and, through it, with Central Asia” (Destradi 2014: 105). India is very popular 
among the Afghan people and has 
“provided training for Afghan businesspeople on international trade and lifted tariffs on most 
Afghan exports to India, not to mention India’s desire to link to Afghanistan’s central Bamyan 
province through […] Chabahar, thereby accessing Afghanistan’s largest known iron ore mine in 
Hajigak (where an Indian consortium already has won the extraction contract).” (Kazemi 2013) 
Continuing good relations with Afghanistan, India’s new government led by Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi has, as a gesture of goodwill, relaxed visa procedures for Afghan citizens and has 
promised USD 100 million for the development of the Iranian port of Chabahar with the intenti-
on of encouraging Afghanistan’s connectivity (Quie 2014). 
6.3 Islamic Republic of Iran 
Key figures Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Hassan Rouhani 
Relevant factions 
Supreme Leader, President, Parliament, Guardian Council, Revolutionary Guards, 
Expediency Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Memberships Istanbul Process, OIC, SCO (observer), Almaty Process (Observer), CICA 
Strong ties Unity Party 
Notable ties Afghan government, Ismail Khan, some IEA commanders, Russia 
Armed opponents Jundallah (PRMI) 
Rivals Saudi Arabia, USA 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
“Withdrawal of U.S. […] military and intelligence forces; a stable regime in Kabul, 
friendly to Iran, and not dominated by Pakistan or its proxies; protection for traditional 
Iranian allies in Afghanistan: Hazaras, Tajiks, and Heratis; trade, investment, and 
transit trade through Char Bahar; return of 2 to 3 million Afghan refugees in Iran; 
reduction/elimination of narcotics trafficking; Kabul cooperation in fight against 
Jundallah [PRMI], in Iranian Baluchistan and beyond” (Pickering 2011: 31) 
Iran has a multifaceted involvement in the Afghanistan conflict. Iran has played an important 
role in the international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. Following the displacement of 
thousands of people, Iran has provided refuge to many Afghans fleeing the conflict. Iran’s influ-
ence is likely to grow after the withdrawal of ISAF. Despite being viewed as counterproductive by 
28 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
the US, Iran’s engagement in Afghanistan has been to a large extent productive and in many 
instances even congruent with US regional interests. The conflicting elements in Iran’s Afghani-
stan policy stem from its “dual policy” that it follows in the region. On one hand, Tehran “con-
tinues to oppose the presence of Western military bases in Afghanistan, engages in talks with 
Taliban, invites them for conferences in Iran and even, allegedly, supplies arms to them. At the 
same time, it provides Afghanistan with technical and financial support” (Daud 2014: 9). This 
contradiction can be traced back to two different sets of motives. 
On one hand, Iran has strong ties with the Afghan border province of Herat and with the 
Hazara in Afghanistan who, like 90% of all Iranians, are Shia Muslims. By extending support to 
the Shia Muslims and the Dari-speaking minorities in Afghanistan, Iran wishes to consolidate 
religious solidarity and its economic interests in Afghanistan. Thus, Tehran has supported the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, especially in its Western provinces. Iran has been one of the larg-
est donors to Afghanistan. Exporting critical goods such as food, medicine and oil, Iran’s trade 
with Afghanistan has increased over the years. In addition, Iran has invested in Afghan NGOs, 
schools, and media institutions. Iranians also reached out to other groups beside their fellow 
Shias. Tehran recognizes that a deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan would likely lead 
to the growth of extremist Sunni groups in the region that could align themselves with terrorist 
groups based in Iran (Koepke 2013: 22). Iran, like the US, thus favors stability in Afghanistan and 
is strongly interested in preventing a resurgence of al-Qaeda in the region. Iran also suffers from 
an acute drug crisis that originated in Afghanistan, and it aims to solve this issue via cooperation 
(Kugelman 2014). 
On the other hand, Tehran feels encircled by the US military and intelligence presence along 
its borders and is objected to long-term US installations in Afghanistan. US support for Saudi 
Arabia and Jundallah are other sources of concern for Iran. Thus, Tehran has established chan-
nels of communication with the Afghan insurgency, and its Revolutionary Guards are believed to 
support Taliban commanders. It has also 
“allowed a Taliban office to open in Iran, and a high-level Taliban delegation traveled from Qatar 
to Iran in early June 2013 (prior to the opening of the Taliban office there) for meetings with Ira-
nian officials. […] While some see the contacts as Iranian support of the insurgency, others see it 
as an effort to exert some influence over reconciliation efforts.” (Katzman 2014a: 49) 
Soon after the 2014 Afghan presidential elections, Iranian Vice President Shariatmadari met 
Afghan President Ghani to discuss the close ties between the neighboring countries. The two 
leaders agreed upon the importance of continued cooperation, and Iran offered to support the 
education of Afghan migrants in Iran (Office of the President of the IRoA 2014b). This friendly 
gesture is an example of further cooperation and collaboration, especially in education and trade, 
in the future. The 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement might increase the chances of Tehran further 
strengthening these economic and reconstruction components of its engagement in Afghanistan, 
and incentives to beef up military and intelligence capabilities against the US might decrease. 
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6.4 Republic of Turkey 
Key figures President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu 
Subordinated Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MİT, TIKA 
Memberships Istanbul Process, NATO, OIC, SCO (dialogue partner), CICA 
Strong ties USA 
Notable ties Afghanistan, Pakistan, National Islamic Movement, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan 
Armed opponents Al-Qaeda, Kurdish organizations, ISIS 
Rivals Iran, Russia 
Relevance of conflict Low 
Key interests 
Strengthen its position as an autonomous actor in the Middle East and Central Asia 
(Giustozzi 2013: 9); promote indivisibility of regional security and politics of non-
interference (Kordaş 2013); support a strong, central Kabul that includes all major 
Afghan groups (Kordaş 2013: 8–9); support Turkic peoples in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia; encourage economic ties between Afghanistan and Pakistan (Weitz 2011; Kordaş 
2013: 10–17); protect Turkish construction sector in Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Turkey 2013); maintain its presence in Afghanistan past the withdrawal of 
NATO troops 
Turkey has a long-term commitment to assist Afghanistan because of their shared cultural bonds 
and Islamic culture. Still, Ankara’s active engagement in cooperative security measures should 
also be interpreted in the context of the transformation of Turkey’s foreign policy over the last 
few years. In order to strengthen its position as an autonomous actor in the Middle East and 
Central Asia, Ankara pursues an assertive role in regional politics and provides substantial aid 
through its TIKA development agency (Kordaş 2013). In addition, Ankara has led a variety of 
diplomatic initiatives in the region. 
Turkey is a secular democracy and 99% of its people are Muslim. It is the only NATO mem-
ber state that is also a member of the OIC. While Turkey sent troops to Afghanistan, it limits 
their involvement to logistical assistance and capacity building for the ANSF (Kaya 2013: 23–24) 
and prohibits their participation in combat operations on Muslim lands. In line with its strong 
belief that security is tied to governance and economic development, Ankara assists Kabul in 
these areas (Kordaş 2013: 5–7). As part of ISAF, the Turkish government supported a PRT model 
that focused on “the fields of education, health, and infrastructure” (Kaya 2013: 24). 
Ankara presents itself as a neutral mediator in Afghanistan and beyond and claims not to use 
its ethnic ties with the Uzbek and Turkmen communities in a purely instrumental way. Ankara 
even encourages other regional actors to forgo “jockeying for influence” in the fragile state 
(Kordaş 2013: 16). However, sources indicate that educational opportunities provided for young 
Afghans have facilitated the formation of a pro-Turkish wing of Dostum’s Uzbek National Islam-
ic Movement (Giustozzi 2012a: 16–17). Continuing its long-standing relationship with Afghani-
stan and demonstrating support to the newly elected government, Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan recently signed an agreement on closer bilateral ties between the two countries 
(Arab News 2014). 
Ankara has also hosted several meetings with Afghanistan and Pakistan since 2007 which fo-
cused on counter-terrorism activities and intelligence sharing, in addition to economic develop-
ment and joint military exercises. However, these trilateral summits have not yet produced great 
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changes in the complicated relationship between Kabul and Islamabad (Kordaş 2013: 23). In 
addition, Ankara is the driving force behind the Istanbul Process for Regional Cooperation in the 
“Heart of Asia.” As part of this process, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, the UAE, 
and Uzbekistan coordinate political consultations, CBMs, and their policies regarding Afghani-
stan.  
6.5 People’s Republic of China 
Key figures President Xi Jinpeng and Premier of the State Council Li Keqiang 
Subordinated MCC (state-owned) 
Memberships SCO, Istanbul Process, CICA 
Strong ties Pakistan 
Notable ties Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
Armed opponents ETIM 
Rivals USA, NATO 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
“Secure access to Afghan minerals and resources;” help Pakistan “avoid encirclement by 
India” (Katzman 2014a: 54); contain the spread of militant Islamism; maintain regional 
stability; control separatist ambitions in Xinjiang 
While China shares a very small border with Afghanistan, Chinese policy in Central Asia has for 
a long time been “quiet and cautious, focused on developing the region as an economic partner 
with its western province Xinjiang” (Kim/Indeo 2013: 280). China’s primary interest in Afghani-
stan stems from its objective to contain the separatist tendencies in its Xinjiang province. “The 
security interaction between Afghanistan and Xinjiang is obvious; as a neighbor of China, Af-
ghanistan has strong influence on the security of Xinjiang” (Huasheng 2012: 3). China also suf-
fers from drug trafficking and Afghanistan happens to be one of the largest source countries. The 
China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) secured the $3 billion contract for Logar prov-
ince’s Aynak copper mine, the largest foreign investment project in Afghanistan. 
“As far as infrastructure building and resource extraction go, Moscow and Beijing, not Washing-
ton, increasingly see one another as rivals in Central Asia. Central Asian security falls in a natural 
Russian sphere of influence, while Central Asian energy and economics falls in a Chinese sphere 
of influence.” (Kim/Indeo 2013: 280) 
China is also a member of the Heart-of-Asia/Istanbul process and states that it wants the states of 
the regions to “build consensus, work together to support efforts to complete the triple transi-
tions, and encourage the situation in Afghanistan to move toward lasting peace” (Yi 2014). 
China has “long-time close relations with Pakistan” (Pickering/Brahimi 2011: 12) and often 
relied on Pakistan for assessing Afghan politics. However, since 2011, this relationship has been 
changing. First, “following China’s rising economic interest in Afghanistan and a clash between 
the two countries on the issue of the training of Uyghur Islamist groups in Pakistan,” the Chinese 
government raised the “profile and information-gathering activities of its embassy in Kabul” 
(Giustozzi 2013: 3). Then, observers started pointing out that Beijing had supposedly reached out 
to the Taliban. Motivations include the desire to control Islamism and separatism in Xinjiang as 
well as the protection of its economic projects in Afghanistan, which may be at risk following 
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ISAF’s withdrawal. At the same time, Beijing publicly sent “reassuring messages to the Afghan 
government” (Daud 2014: 8). Finally, within the last year, Beijing has adopted a much more af-
firmative stand concerning intra-Afghan reconciliation. This includes Chinese efforts to encour-
age Pakistan to play a productive role in facilitating the Taliban’s participation in peace talks. 
While China does not want the US or NATO to establish a permanent military presence in Af-
ghanistan, “Chinese experts fear that a complete NATO military withdrawal from Central Asia 
would contribute to regional instability and terrorism” (Kim/Indeo 2013: 280), and a peace pro-
cess that leads to an economic prosperous Afghanistan and a more stable region is thus in Bei-
jing’s interest. Hence, “Chinese thinking on Afghanistan has evolved significantly since 2001, 
gradually shifting from a largely hands-off approach a decade ago to one approaching more ac-
tive engagement today.” (Scobell 2015: 325) 
6.6 Russian Federation 
Key figures President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev 
Subordinated FSB, FSKN, Gazprom             
Memberships CIS, EAU, SCO, Istanbul Process, CSTO, OIC (observer status), CICA 
Strong ties India, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
Notable ties Iran, Pakistan 
Armed opponents IMU, al-Qaeda 
Rivals USA, NATO, China, Saudi Arabia 
Relevance of conflict Low 
Key interests 
Advance economic integration with the Eurasian Union; contain militant Islamism; 
control US and Western influence in Central Asia; support a stable central Kabul that 
is able to control its territories and combat terrorist activities (Jones/Crane 2013: 12); 
combat drug-trafficking from Afghanistan; ensure that energy interests are not 
threatened by Beijing (Trenin 2010: 73; Harooni 2014) 
With the withdrawal of ISAF forces from Afghanistan, the Russian Federation is reassessing its 
Afghanistan policy. Two major factors are important in understanding Russia’s so far limited 
involvement in the Afghanistan conflict in spite of its status as a key player in the region (Daud 
2014: 7). On one hand, Russia has a long history of colonial and cultural ties with the Central 
Asian republics. On the other hand, negative memories of the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghani-
stan have resulted in the so-called “Afghan syndrome” among Russia’s government and public, 
which rejects Russian participation in the conflict (Trenin: 74; Giustozzi 2013: 8). 
Moscow aims to sustain its influence in Central Asia and continues to recruit various Central 
Asian states for its Eurasian Union, though with varying degrees of success. Some observers ar-
gue that Russian strategy is shifting from “regional mediation” and influence maximization “to a 
more focused logic of hierarchy. Russia seems to be abandoning its previous doctrine of exerting 
general regional influence in favor of pursuing more focused influence and integration with Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan” (Cooley/Laruelle 2013: 1–2). Potential spillover effects of a 
collapsing Afghanistan in Central Asia are a big concern for Russia, which is afraid of the spread 
of militant Islamism. Of prominent concern is Islamic radicalism in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
as well as drug trafficking from Afghanistan, which has increased in the last several years (Trenin 
2010: 72; Lundin/Kaathoven 2013: 1). The latter remains a great concern for Moscow as nearly 90 
percent of the narcotics present in Russia are of Afghan origin (Lundin/Kaathoven: 1).  
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However, NATO’s and Russia’s cooperation in Afghanistan faces a new challenge following 
the annexation of Crimea by Russia. Russia’s policies towards Ukraine have been met with a 
number of sanctions imposed by the US and the EU and a setback of NATO-Russia relations 
(Klein/Kaim 2014). This had negative implications in the region for US and NATO military lo-
gistics, which previously benefited from Russian support. NATO ended military cooperation 
with Russia on Afghanistan shortly following the escalation of the Crimea crisis, and one year 
later, Moscow decided to end the military transit deals with NATO related to its Ulyanovsk air-
port. 
7. Arab states of the Persian Gulf 
While Bahrain contributed a moderate number of troops to ISAF, the most relevant actors from 
the Persian Gulf in the context of the Afghanistan conflict are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), and Qatar. These are not only among the region’s richest states, owing to their 
booming oil profits, but also among the most assertive ones when it comes to foreign relations. 
(For more information, see Katzman 2014a, Katzman 2014b). 
Their future engagement with Afghanistan is likely to be shaped by two major factors. First, 
their discontent with US positions in the Syrian Civil War and in context of the Iranian nuclear 
agreement. Second, by the potential contribution they can make to reconciliation and mediation 
in Afghanistan. Doha has tried to play a lead role in negotiations and welcomed the opening of 
an official bureau of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Qatar. However, the related negotia-
tions between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and the international community that the 
office was intended to channel have stalled. 
7.1 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
Key figure King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud 
Subordinated GIP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Saudi Development Fund, wealthy donors 
Memberships OIC, Istanbul Process, CICA 
Strong ties Pakistan, USA 
Notable ties Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, WML, WAMY, Wahabi groups 
Armed opponents Al-Qaeda (AQAP) 
Rivals Iran, Russia 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Implement a more active foreign policy in the global Muslim community (Boucek 
2010: 46); favor reconciliation with the Taliban and an Islamic government that 
maintains religious values and moral restrictions (Mir 2010: 46–48); provide off-budget 
and private assistance and foreign aid for the reconstruction of Afghanistan to 
demonstrate Islamic leadership (Mir 2010: 14); contain Iranian influence in 
Afghanistan (Mir 2010: 13) and in the region 
A predominantly Sunni state and a regional power, Saudi Arabia seeks to contain Iranian Shia 
influence by providing support to Sunni groups within Afghanistan (Mir 2010: 13) and the wider 
region. Funding for radical madrassas in Pakistan (Mir 2010: 13) can be traced back to donors 
from Saudi Arabia. Young Afghans, Chechens, Pakistanis, Uzbeks, and others that were educated 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 33
 
 
at these schools have been known to fight alongside the Taliban over the last twelve years (Daud 
2014: 5–6). Saudi financiers are also thought to depend on the Pakistani military to deliver funds 
to Islamist groups in Afghanistan (Mir 2010: 13). Saudi Arabia has played an important role in 
Afghan political affairs by not only funding Mujahideen fighters during Soviet occupation, but 
also during recent times, by exerting influence over negotiations between the Afghan govern-
ment and the Taliban. Afghanistan’s previous President Karzai considered Saudi Arabia to be a 
key player in the stabilization of Afghanistan as well as an important source of economic invest-
ment (Katzman 2014: 53). 
The versatile involvement of Saudi Arabia in the Afghanistan conflict is completed by its at-
tempts to encourage Kabul’s reconciliation with Islamabad (Giustozzi 2013: 3; Boucek 2010: 49), 
Riyadh’s key regional partner (Daud 2014: 9). Saudi Arabia favors a conservative Sunni govern-
ment in Kabul (Boucek 2010: 46) and was among the three countries to recognize the Taliban’s 
Islamic Emirate as the legitimate government of Afghanistan in 1996 (Giustozzi 2013: 9). 
7.2 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
Key figure President Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan 
Memberships Istanbul Process, OIC, CICA 
Strong ties USA, France 
Notable ties Pakistan, India, NATO 
Armed opponents Jamiat Al-Islah wa Tawjih 
Rivals Iran 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Combat domestic and regional terrorism; cooperate with the US on measures against 
terrorism and its proliferation (Katzman 2014b: 15); provide economic aid for the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan such as educational grants, medical clinics, and 
housing for Afghan families (Katzman 2014b: 20); strengthen economic development; 
establish itself as a “regional hub for businesses and institutions” (Ulrichsen 2012) 
A Sunni state by majority and bordered by Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and Pakistan, the 
UAE perceives its domestic security as strongly tied to its economic stability. The UAE tries to 
pursue its security and economic-related goals while balancing them with domestic inequality 
and calls for political reforms (Ulrichsen 2012). After it was revealed that two of the 9/11 hijack-
ers were UAE nationals, the UAE has increased its cooperation with the US to combat Islamist 
terrorism (Katzman 2014b:15) and sent troops to southern Afghanistan in 2003. The UAE hosts 
the Al Dhafra Air Base (Zenko/Welch 2012) which is used “to perform intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance and aerial refueling” for US forces in Afghanistan (U.S. Air Force Fact Sheets 
2012). France’s first permanent military base in the Persian Gulf, IMFEAU, is also located in the 
UAE. 
Abu Dhabi’s recent decision to double its expenditures on domestic security (Mustafa 2014) 
and the arrests of al-Qaeda terrorist suspects (BBC News Middle East 2013) point to its security 
concerns. Another recent development is the ongoing relocation of Afghan investments and 
human capital to Dubai which observers interpret as a sign of general distrust in a stable Afghan-
istan (Daud 2014: 3–4). At a panel held at the UN under the Abu Dhabi Process, the UAE’s Am-
bassador to the UN emphasized the emirates’ continued support and engagement with Afghani-
stan’s newly elected government. As part of the Abu Dhabi process, leaders from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, India, Turkmenistan, Iran, China, EU and the US, among other nations, have engaged 
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in meetings to discuss regional security and cross-border economic challenges and opportunities 
(Gulf News 2014). 
7.3 State of Qatar 
Key figure Emir Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani 
Memberships OIC, CICA 
Strong ties USA 
Notable ties Iran 
Rivals UAE, Saudi Arabia 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Maintain state’s wealth in its unstable neighborhood; project itself as a neutral mediator 
in the Afghan peace talks, although the Taliban’s political office in Doha proved to be a 
failure (Roberts 2013); compete with Saudi Arabia in exercising its influence in the 
region (Katuli 2013); remain crucial US ally; revive diplomatic relations with other 
regional actors (Ulrichsen 2014) 
The country with the world’s highest GDP per capita (CIA World Factbook 2013a), Qatar is a 
predominantly Sunni Muslim state. Doha tries to strengthen its position in mediating regional 
conflicts (Kamrava 2011) and has hosted the first official office of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate, 
though the related talks between the Taliban, the Afghan government, and the US have stalled. 
Doha’s Al Udeid Air Base hosts the 609th Air and Space Operations Center, including a US drone 
operations command and control center, through which US troops and resources move from 
Qatar to Afghanistan (Zenko/Welch 2012). Qatar’s involvement in Gaza, Lebanon, Sudan, and 
Yemen are examples of its wider engagement in the region (Blanchard 2014). 
However, Qatar might exert a less assertive foreign policy in the future because of its new 
Emir, Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, who is reportedly shifting away from his father’s interven-
tionist policies and focusing more on domestic issues (Ulrichsen 2014).  
8. Central Asian states 
Following 9/11, Central Asia moved into the focus of American foreign policy which caused se-
vere disruptions in the network of regional alliances. Today, the US relies on the newly estab-
lished Northern Distribution Network (NDN), “a commercially-based logistical corridor con-
necting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan via Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia” 
(CSIS Experts in the Field 2010) in order to manage the withdrawal of non-lethal supplies from 
Afghanistan through Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan (Nichol 2013a: 25). The NDN also 
serves the long-term goal of a “New Silk Road” that integrates Afghanistan economically and 
politically with the region for a sustained economic activity in Central and South Asia (Stein 
2012: 75). 
Central Asian states are at different stages of economic development, with resource-rich Ka-
zakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan on one side, and poorer Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan on 
the other. All states of the region have expressed their concern over the withdrawal of ISAF 
troops, stating that the situation is likely to deteriorate further. However, there is no coherent 
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Central Asian approach towards Afghanistan. Some experts argue that the Central Asian repub-
lics’ policies “can be explained by referring to factors such as its proximity to and existing links 
with Afghanistan, its own vulnerability and capacity as a state, its perspectives and attitudes, and 
its foreign-policy style, along with complex intra-regional politics and the geopolitical context” 
(Kassenova 2014: 2). Indeed, these factors make Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan more 
vulnerable as NATO proceeds to withdraw from the region, with the last one being the most 
susceptible to potential spillovers. Others argue that the lack of regional cooperation and a variety 
of regional and country-specific issues remain major sources of instability (Cooley 2012; Quinn-
Judge 2010: 62–63). These issues include migration, a deteriorating physical infrastructure and 
porous borders, the lack of transparent and accountable political institutions, ethnic tensions, 
rising Islamic radicalism, and environmental problems. 
Although most of them contributed to and benefited from the logistics behind the NATO in-
tervention, such as the movement of supplies, the Central Asian states do not play a major role in 
the reconstruction of Afghanistan, mostly because of their limited political weight and a complex 
set of political factors. While US and Chinese involvement in the region has increased during the 
last decade, the region is still heavily interconnected with Russia. For instance, Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, and Tajikistan rely on the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for 
their security needs. At the same time, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan managed to maintain more 
independent foreign policies. Kazakhstan is a member of Moscow’s ambitious Eurasian Econom-
ic Union (EAU). However, in the light of worsening relations between Russia and the West fol-
lowing the 2015 Crimea crisis, and taking into account decreasing oil prices, it remains to be seen 
whether Central Asian states that are dependent on Russia can find more room for shifting away 
from the direct sphere of Russian influence and increase their ties and trade with other regional 
and global partners. 
While this chapter gives an overview of the Central Asian states’ interests in the context of the 
conflict, it does not focus on the internal divisions of the republics. It should be noted that these 
must be taken into account in deeper, country-specific assessments. For instance, while national 
governments may officially declare their intentions to combat regional drug-trafficking, local 
border patrols or political clans may in fact benefit from the drug trade. Hence, country experts 
and more specialized literature should be consulted in order to understand the internal divisions 
that shape the Afghanistan policy of the Central Asian states. 
8.1 Republic of Tajikistan 
Key figures President Emomali Rahmon and Prime Minister Kokhir Rasulzoda 
Memberships CIS, CSTO, EAU (candidate), OIC, SCO, Istanbul Process, Almaty Process, Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability, CICA
Strong ties Russia 
Notable ties USA, Iran, Afghanistan, China, India, USAID
Armed opponents IMU, IEA, al-Qaeda
Rivals Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, HuT (domestic)
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Control Islamism and terrorism; prevent spillover effects from Afghanistan to avoid 
refugees and local ethnic clashes; protect national borders; tackle cross-border drug-
trafficking; prevent the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (ISW 2013); develop 
“alternative trade routes via Afghanistan to South Asia” to decrease its economic 
dependence on Uzbekistan (Kassenova 2014: 15); increase trade exchange 
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The poorest of all Central Asian states and the world’s most remittance-dependent country – 
many Tajik laborers work in Kazakhstan and Russia (The World Bank 2013) – Tajikistan shares a 
1,200-km-long border with Afghanistan. Tajikistan’s civil war (1992–97) involved militant Islam-
ists from Northern Afghanistan (Gretsky 1995: 218). These two factors, along with Tajiks being 
the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan (CIA World Factbook 2013), explain why Tajiki-
stan pays close attention to the developments in Kabul.  
A fading infrastructure and a lack of proper management make border control and the con-
trol of drug-trafficking very difficult, despite assistance from the Russian 201st Motor Rifle Divi-
sion. Its fragile economy and a high unemployment rate exacerbate its vulnerability to a potential 
spillover of insurgent and terrorist activities from Afghanistan. Observers argue that militant 
Islamists will find a population ready for alternative models of political order, such as a form of 
Islamic state as proposed by radical groups (Quinn-Judge 2010: 56–59). On the other hand, Du-
shanbe sees economic opportunities in a more stable Afghanistan. It is eager to develop trade 
routes through Afghanistan to South Asia in order to have an alternative to Russian and Uzbek 
routes. Also, together with Kyrgyzstan, it favors the realization of the Central Asia-South Asia 
electricity grid (CASA-1000) in order to export electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. The pro-
ject is opposed by Uzbekistan and requires international financial support. Tajikistan also hopes 
that the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway project (Kassenova 2014: 21) will have a 
positive impact on its economy. 
While Dushanbe fears that NATO and US policies in Afghanistan favor Pashtuns at the ex-
pense of Tajiks, it favors power-sharing between the different ethnic groups (Kassenova 2014: 
14). It also prefers not to see the return of the Taliban to Kabul since it believes that this could 
lead to armed confrontations involving Afghan Tajiks (Laruelle/Peyrose/ Axyonova 2013: 9). The 
future of the two countries is thus heavily intertwined. 
8.2 Republic of Uzbekistan 
Key figures President Islam Karimov and Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoyev
Memberships CIS, OIC, SCO, Istanbul Process, Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability, CICA 
Notable ties Germany, Russia, India, Japan, Iran, National Islamic Movement, ADB, EAU 
Armed opponents IMU, IEA, al-Qaeda, IJU
Rivals Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, HuT (domestic), Akromiya (domestic) 
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Strengthen state independence and sovereignty (Nichol 2013b: 11); develop “alternative 
trade routes via Afghanistan to South Asia” to decrease its dependence on Kazakhstan 
and Russia (Kassenova 2014: 15); continue electricity exports to Kabul and railway 
investments in Afghanistan; prevent the construction of Tajikistan’s Rogun Dam; 
maintain logistical contracts within NDN while silencing the West’s calls for the respect 
of human rights; prevent IMU from developing closer ties with the Afghan Taliban; 
combat drug trafficking; provide financial and military support to anti-Taliban forces 
in case of IEA’s return to Kabul (Chayes 2012)
Home to nearly half of Central Asia’s population, Uzbekistan shares a short border with Afghani-
stan and longer borders with all other Central Asian states. Much of the drugs smuggled out of 
Afghanistan to China, Europe, and Russia pass through Uzbekistan’s border (Stein 2012: 76). 
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Aspiring to become a main transportation hub, Uzbekistan benefits from intense competition 
between Chinese and Indian firms. It already is a key player in Central Asia in terms of electricity 
supply to and transportation connections with Afghanistan (Laruelle/Peyrose/Axyonova 2013: 
6–7). In 2011, five out of six NDN shipments went through Southern Uzbekistan (Cooley 2012: 
45). Relations between Uzbekistan and the US are strained since the US condemned the massacre 
in Andijan in 2005, but the US has made attempts to improve them (Nichol 2013b: 17–23). Uz-
bekistan possesses the largest and strongest military force in Central Asia, and advances security 
cooperation with changing preferences between the US and NATO and Russia. “Karimov stated 
that closer bilateral ties [with Kazakhstan] were needed to address the drawdown of International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in Afghanistan” and related economic developments 
(Nichol 2013b: 13). 
Domestically, Tashkent fights to dismantle a variety of militant Islamist groups, including the 
IMU. A 2010 update of the IMU website listed “martyrs” from Northern Afghanistan and Uz-
bekistan (Stein 2012: 79). The history of the IMU and its current connection with the Taliban 
suggest that it will continue to play a role in Afghanistan (Stein 2012: 80). Therefore, Tashkent’s 
major interest in the Afghanistan conflict is not economic, but political: to prevent the IMU from 
benefitting from the fighting in Afghanistan and from de-stabilizing Uzbekistan. 
8.3 Turkmenistan 
Key figure President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedow
Memberships Istanbul Process, Almaty Process, OIC, SCO (guest), CIS (unofficial associate), CICA
Notable ties Turkey, Ismail Khan, India, Pakistan
Relevance of conflict Low 
Key interests 
Maintain “neutral” foreign policy, but continue to play a role in regional politics as part 
of the Istanbul Process (Kazemi 2013); gain geopolitical independence from Russia; 
continue cooperation with the government in Kabul regardless of its composition; 
strengthen its borders with Afghanistan (RFE/RL 2014); continue to supply 
Afghanistan with electricity; “construct the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India 
pipeline and a railway project that would run through Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and 
Tajikistan” (UN News Centre 2014)
Ashgabat officially pursues a policy of strict neutrality in foreign affairs. In a 1995 resolution, the 
UNGA has recognized this position and has stated it supports the “the status of permanent neu-
trality declared by Turkmenistan” (UNGA 1995). Some experts say that Ashgabat shifted away 
from its isolationist policy as it joined the Istanbul Process and Almaty Process (Kassenova 2014: 
5).  
Turkmenistan is bordered by Iran, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan, and it has porous borders 
with Afghanistan. Following armed confrontation in September 2014 between the Taliban and 
Turkmen border guards, Turkmenistan is reportedly strengthening its borders with Afghanistan 
along Faryab and Jowzjan provinces, perhaps at the cost of cutting communications with ethnic 
Turkmens on the Afghan side of the border (Alternative News Turkmenistan 2014, RFE/RL 
2014). 
Although Ashgabat tries to shield itself from the political turmoil in Afghanistan, it is likely to 
continue its trade and energy cooperation regardless of power shifts in Kabul (Giustozzi 2013: 6), 
and strives to achieve political and economic independence from Russia. Turkmenistan is “home 
to some of the largest undeveloped oil and natural gas fields in the world” (ISW 2014). The 
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) Pipeline, a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline to 
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connect Turkmenistan’s gas to Europe (Petersen 2012), is scheduled to be finished by 2017. It is 
considered an important component part of Turkmenistan’s policy of geopolitical independence 
(Sadykov 2013).  
8.4 Republic of Kazakhstan 
Key figures President Nursultan Nazarbayev and Prime Minister Karim Massimov 
Memberships CSTO, CIS, EAU, SCO, OIC, Istanbul Process, Almaty Process, Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability, CICA
Strong ties Russia 
Notable ties USA, China, India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan 
Armed opponents IMU, IEA 
Rivals HuT (domestic) 
Relevance of conflict Low 
Key interests 
Maintain multi-vector foreign policy; present itself as a stable and prosperous regional 
leader; maintain its credit rating and increase international investments in the country; 
assist the reconstruction of Afghanistan; continue its adoption of the CBMs for disaster 
management as part of the Istanbul Process (Kazemi 2013; Daud 2014: 2); maintain 
bilateral trade with and continue heavy wheat exports to Afghanistan 
(Laruelle/Peyrose/Axyonova 2013: 7)
A relatively prosperous country by regional standards, Kazakhstan enjoyed a rapid increase in its 
GDP over the last two decades, mostly owing to its significant oil exports. Of all the Central 
Asian states, it shares the largest border with Russia. However, it does not border Afghanistan 
and lacks ethnic connections with it, making Kazakhstan less vulnerable and allowing for, as 
some observers call it, “a calmer and less biased approach to developments in Afghanistan” 
(Kassenova 2014: 3). Kazakhstan’s major interests include establishing itself as a stable regional 
leader, advancing its relations with the West while not alienating Russia in order to maintain its 
“multi-vector foreign policy,” and retaining the profits associated with its involvement in air and 
land transit operations of NATO and US troops. Astana is interested in securing a non-
permanent seat on the UNSC for 2017–18 (MFA Kazakhstan 2014). 
Kazakhstan’s concerted efforts to increase its international reputation as a trustworthy partner 
influenced Astana’s decision to provide increased humanitarian aid to Afghanistan. Kazakhstan’s 
Assistance Program for the Reconstruction of Afghanistan focuses on water supply, infrastruc-
ture development, and construction commodities, while the Agreement on Cooperation in Edu-
cation focused on educating Afghan students at Kazakhstan’s universities from 2010 to 2014 
(Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the USA 2013). In addition, the Central Asian state 
hosts the Almaty Process, an ongoing initiative of Kazakhstan in response to the migration dy-
namics in the region (IOM 2013), which brings together Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Iran (Observer), and Pakistan (Observer). 
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8.5 Kyrgyz Republic 
Key figures President Almazbek Atambayev and Prime Minister Temir Sariyev 
Memberships CSTO, CIS, OIC, SCO, Istanbul Process, Almaty Process, Joint Declaration on Regional Peace and Stability, EAU (candidate), CICA
Strong ties Russia, USA 
Notable ties China, Turkey, Kazakhstan
Armed opponents IMU 
Rivals Uzbekistan, Tablighi Jamaat (domestic), HuT (domestic)
Relevance of conflict Medium 
Key interests 
Tackle security issues associated with the drug trade coming from Afghanistan; 
maintain stability in ethnically diverse southern Kyrgyzstan; receive assistance and 
expertise necessary to control its borders (Kim/Indeo 2013: 282); benefit from 
internationally planned and regionally implemented projects for the economic 
recovery of Afghanistan, such as the Kambaratinsk Dam and CASA-1000 
Bordered by China, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan is highly dependent on 
foreign assistance and expertise to control migration through its borders. Observers believe that 
Kyrgyzstan is not capable of maintaining control in case of a revival of ethnic conflicts in Osh, 
Southern Kyrgyzstan (Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2012), or in case of a spillover of insur-
gent activities from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Kim/Indeo 2013: 282). Tablighi Jamaat, a move-
ment that is ideologically close to the IEA, has a significant number of followers in Kyrgyzstan. 
Of notable concern are consequences of the drug smuggling from Afghanistan, including human 
trafficking, rising HIV rates, drug addiction, increased criminal activity, and alternative power 
structures that have appeared in the South (Olcott 2010: 51). 
Even though Bishkek is ready to compromise to a certain degree with external actors when it 
comes to its sovereignty (Olcott 2010: 57), it seeks to maintain a delicate balance in cooperating 
between US, China, and Russia in order to increase its economic security and manage its large 
budget deficit (Kim/Indeo 2013: 282). In this context, Bishkek seeks to benefit from regional 
infrastructure projects. For instance, it seeks to employ its Kambarata hydroelectric project that is 
financed by Russia but opposed by Uzbekistan, in order to export energy to Afghanistan (Olcott 
2010: 55). Also, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the main exporters of electricity to Afghanistan 
and Pakistan through the CASA-1000 project backed by the Asian Development Bank and the 
World Bank (The World Bank 2014).  
9. Conclusion 
A negotiated settlement could end more than 30 years of civil war in Afghanistan and help stabi-
lize a region plagued with turmoil and violent extremism. However, the complexity of the con-
flict is a main obstacle to negotiations. An assessment of the different actors and their interests 
and relationships in the context of the overlapping and interconnected cleavages and sub-
conflicts in Afghanistan and Central Asia reveals a multifaceted network of relationships. This 
report concludes with a visualization of this network based on the information provided in the 
previous chapters, a brief outline of three future scenarios, and a set of recommendations related 
to an inclusive peace process. 
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9.1 Network of relationships 
Because of the interconnected nature of the sub-conflicts, in which political, economic, and stra-
tegic problems are heavily intertwined and which involve a variety of actors, no party alone can 
decide the fate of Afghanistan or shape the future of Central Asia. This uncertainty serves as an 
incentive to all parties, both state and non-state, to engage in various “hedging strategies” in or-
der to prevent marginalization. For the states of the region, the lack of a legitimate forum or insti-
tutional framework that they can rely on in order to balance their interests further reinforces 
patterns of mistrust and misperception. A notable feature of the conflict is a shortage of static, 
reliable, and durable coalitions built on trust among the main parties. Instead, relevant actors 
constantly renegotiate, adjust, or shift their alliances, or rely on different actors to advance differ-
ent goals. Overall, the relationships of the parties to the conflict are best described as a multifacet-
ed network of sometimes contradictory alliances. 
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This network diagram visualizes the relationships between the parties assessed in the previous 
chapters. In order to capture the interplay between the domestic and the transnational dimensi-
ons of the Afghanistan conflict, notable Afghan warlords and other Afghan politicians are listed 
as individual figures. As the diagram demonstrates, some actors are placed at strategic locations 
within the network which enable them to play a key role in peace negotiations. 
In comparison with the network of relationships before the 2014 presidential elections, Presi-
dent Ghani has been able to improve the overall position of the Afghan government by integrat-
ing warlords and other politicians with a variety of different backgrounds into the new admin-
istration. The emergence of a powerful political opposition which could become an influential 
political opponent of the new government has thus been prevented. 
The United States remains a key player in the region in spite of the withdrawal of most of its 
military forces: It continues to be the most important international partner of the Afghan gov-
ernment and has strong alliances with other states in the region, most notably with India and 
Pakistan. 
Two categories of actors deserve special attention when assessing the chances of a new round 
of peace talks in Afghanistan: Those who have ties with the insurgency, and those who are able to 
leverage ties with key players indirectly across the network. Pakistan, Iran, and Qatar continue to 
have ties or channels of communication with the Afghan Taliban that they could use in order to 
further facilitate the insurgents’ participation in sustainable negotiations. Turkey, China, and 
Saudi Arabia have the potential to emerge as influential power-brokers, yet the involvement of 
the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, from where donations for militant Islamists continue to find 
their way into the region, is multifaceted. 
9.2 Scenarios 
As this report has shown, the conflict in Afghanistan, in both its domestic and in its regional 
dimension, is highly complicated and involves a wide range of actors. The current situation can 
be characterized as a “mutually hurting stalemate” (Zartman 2001: 1): In Afghanistan, no one is 
strong enough to win the war, but many are strong enough to prevent peace. The same can be 
said about the region: No state is strong enough to push through a regional political agenda that 
only serves its own goals, but many are powerful enough to keep the patterns of mistrust and 
hostilities alive, instead of shifting to a more cooperative regional environment. 
As a result, it is complicated to predict the future of Afghanistan and the region. The follow-
ing three scenarios are all possible based on the evidence presented in the previous chapters. The 
recommendations presented in the end of this report focus on the third scenario – an official, 
inclusive, multi-level peace process. 
1. The worst-case scenario would be an escalation of the Afghan civil war which would send 
the country back to the 1990s. In such a scenario, the conflict of legitimacy between insurgency 
and government dramatically escalates because all efforts to end the war remain completely fruit-
less. Finally succumbing to violence from the insurgency, pressure from society, and internal 
conflict, the government of unity disintegrates into factions and tribal thinking. The states of the 
region fail to increase cooperation and to build trust, but are drawn into a spiral of increased 
mistrust and rivalry. As a consequence, various governments hedge their bets by beefing up sup-
port for their preferred Afghan proxies and other non-state actors across the region. As a result, 
Afghanistan would enter another decade of civil war in which the central government merely 
controls the urban centers. The Afghan Taliban and their allies expand their control in the rest of 
the country and different warlords struggle to carve out their own de-facto states in their strong-
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holds. The level of violence would increase, and more civilians would be harmed and killed. For 
the radical wings of the different militant Islamist movements in the region, such an outcome 
would be good news, since political, socio-economic, and separatist grievances across Central 
Asia would grow, waiting to be exploited. Instability and chaos would also grow in Pakistan, and 
the region would turn into the stage of an increasingly violent, internationalized civil war. 
2. In a status-quo scenario, a collapse of the Afghan government can be prevented through 
negotiations conducted by President Ghani and CEO Abdullah with warlords, international sup-
porters, and the insurgency, yet a diplomatic breakthrough that would bring the Taliban back 
into the political process cannot be accomplished. The government of national unity finds a 
common agenda and increases legitimacy in the eyes of the people by fighting corruption and 
tackling economic and social problems. Still, only some factions of the insurgency join the politi-
cal process, and other groups continue the armed struggle. While the Afghan government con-
tinues to receive US and international support, and while it does not face the risk of being over-
thrown by force, clashes between its security forces and insurgent fighters continue. There may 
be some reforms to the political system, and, potentially, a slight increase of trust between Af-
ghanistan and Pakistan, yet the war does not end. Regionally, there might be some progress in 
policy areas on which there is overall agreement, but no “big push” for more integration. As a 
result, Afghanistan and Central Asia will enter a decade of “muddling through,” which leads to 
no further deterioration of the security situation, but also no peace for Afghanistan and no hope 
for a more peaceful and more prosperous future for the region. 
3. Finally, there is the end-of-war scenario in which the war in Afghanistan will come to an 
end as the result of inclusive peace negotiations between the government and the insurgency. It is 
difficult to project the path of negotiations, or even the elements of a potential settlement. Based 
on the previous chapters, this report recommends treating the Afghanistan conflict as inter-
twined with regional politics in Central Asia. The sequencing of official talks should be based on 
a careful analysis of all Afghan, regional, and international actors which takes their internal fac-
tions and contradictions into account. A multi-level, inclusive process should be designed in 
order to de-escalate the violence and to make the “end-of-war scenario” more likely. 
An important goal of an inclusive negotiation process is to replace a system dominated by 
mistrust and hedging strategies with a system dominated by trust and cooperation. Negotiations 
should first address those cleavages and relationships with a high level of violence and risk of 
escalation. If the intra-Afghan conflict of legitimacy, the regional security dilemma, and the com-
plicated relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan are de-escalated by means of negotia-
tions, Afghanistan and Central Asia would move a big step closer towards a cooperative and 
more peaceful future. 
In orchestrating a peace process, the three scenarios are a useful reference point when as-
sessing a party’s alternative to a negotiated agreement: While many parties might prefer a “mud-
dling through” over a negotiated settlement with painful concessions, the number of parties that 
would prefer the “worst-case scenario” over the same agreement is much lower. Hence, parties 
resisting accommodation through negotiation should be confronted with the constant risk of 
Afghanistan collapsing into even more chaos, as long as no substantial and credible steps towards 
an agreement are undertaken. 
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9.3 Recommendations 
It is extremely complicated to address all sub-conflicts in Afghanistan and Central Asia at the 
same time, or to build trust across the entire network. Prior to the identification of the parties’ 
red lines and “non-negotiables,” it is also difficult to predict possible results. Only exploratory 
talks can shed light on where concessions, compromises, and creative solutions can be found. 
Hence, negotiations should first address those cleavages with a high level of violence and risk of 
escalation, while leveraging those relationships that are essential in this particular context. These 
recommendations are grouped into two sets of suggestions. The first one deals with the challenge 
of successfully setting the table for a negotiation process, the second one with key issues to be 
addressed once this has been accomplished. 
The guiding premise should be that only a multi-level peace agreement that eventually secures 
the buy-in from all relevant parties to the conflict will be sustainable and guarantee lasting peace 
in Afghanistan and beyond. In a mutually hurting stalemate, a “ripe moment” occurs when the 
parties realize they cannot win a war relying on the use of force and subsequently engage in nego-
tiations. It is hard to assess whether the conflict in Afghanistan already reached this “ripe mo-
ment”: On the one hand, the insurgents might see a chance to gain influence in the context of the 
establishment of a new government and the withdrawal of most international troops if they beef 
up their attacks. “There is an emerging consensus in Afghanistan that the insurgents will only 
talk seriously after testing the military strength of Afghan forces once the internationals exit” 
(ICG 2014: 5), an anticipation proved by the attacks on the day of the inauguration of the new 
government (Clark 2014c) and several prominent attacks in Kabul since then. On the other hand, 
the Taliban have shown willingness to negotiate in Qatar, where they opened an office in 2012, as 
well as in several other exploratory talks since then, most recently in a new round co-facilitated 
by China. Previous negotiation attempts between the Taliban and the US failed; according to the 
Taliban, because of “Washington’s failure to fulfill the conditions for peace negotiations to pro-
ceed” (Ayman 2013: 14). Even though the peace process will take a long time, all negotiation 
attempts from all parties should be taken seriously. This requires all parties to the conflict to not 
use a ceasefire merely in order to prepare the next round of attacks, or to constantly blame others 
for not living up to expectations in terms of building trust, but to seriously engage in accommo-
dation through dialogue. Some examples that might facilitate a negotiation process and help 
setting the table are the following: 
 NATO and the US should accept that they are parties involved in the conflict instead of 
pretending to be neutral actors whose sole interest it is to keep the peace. This includes, for 
instance, an admission of “mistakes made in their approach to Afghanistan before and after 
2001” (Foxley 2013: 38). In order to build trust, the US could, in close collaboration with 
the Afghan government, offer an unlimited cease-fire and enter negotiations with the in-
surgency without conditions. The Afghan government, the US, and NATO should also 
guarantee that members of insurgency participating in exploratory talks are not going to be 
arrested, persecuted, or attacked during the armistice. Such a process would have to be de-
signed in a way that a further reduction of the “state’s already thin monopoly of the use of 
force” (ICG 2012: 23) can be prevented. 
 While it will be very difficult to convince the insurgency to join official negotiations, most 
scholars argue that it is not impossible. A main incentive could be international political 
legitimacy in return for integration in the existing political system in Afghanistan. One of 
the main challenges is that the Afghan insurgency is not one united group with a repre-
sentative leadership. While the HIG signaled willingness to join negotiations, the Haqqani 
network seems to be more opposed, and different factions of the Taliban disagree (Jack-
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son/Giustozzi 2012: 9; Giustozzi 2013: 2). Following the transition of the Taliban leadership 
from Mullah Omar to Mullah Mansour, these divisions are likely to erupt again, possible 
preventing the new Taliban leadership from embracing a clear stance towards peace talks. 
Therefore, a successful armistice would not necessarily mean that all violence in Afghani-
stan would cease immediately. However, when in 2008, Kai Eide, then Head of UNAMA, 
successfully lobbied ISAF, the Afghan government and the Taliban for a stop of military 
operations on world peace day, security incidents fell by an impressive 70%. Hence, with 
the official buy-in from the Taliban leadership, and with the support of a significant part of 
the insurgency, it is possible to de-escalate the armed conflict considerably. 
 In a long-term perspective, a coordinated framework is necessary in order to facilitate ne-
gotiations. The Afghan High Peace Council (HPC) has been trying to initiate talks with Tal-
iban leaders, yet it never gained enough legitimacy. Up until now, negotiations “have been 
very poorly coordinated, if at all” (Sheikh 2013: 7). Initiatives are lacking a common agenda 
and “bargains are being cut with any and all comers, regardless of their political relevance 
or ability to influence outcomes” (ICG 2012: i). The different tracks have to be synchro-
nized in one negotiation framework that is accepted by all parties to the conflict. 
 To be successful, the process leading to negotiations and the negotiations itself should be 
accompanied by a mediator. While the UN is not perceived as a neutral actor by all parties, 
major Afghan Civil Society Organizations could potentially establish a mediation team rep-
resenting the country’s ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. Afghan-led negotiations 
could facilitate the insurgency’s buy-in, and traditional ways of conflict resolution could be 
included. National institutions that could assist and provide resources are the HPC and the 
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission. For the organization and mediation 
of negotiations on the international level, Afghan Civil Society Organizations could ask rel-
atively neutral yet influential states, such as Turkey, Germany, and China, as well as inter-
national organizations such as the UN and CICA to appoint a mediating task force. The 
mediator’s main task would be to guarantee transparency and inclusiveness and to promote 
the coordinated negotiation framework suggested above. 
 A key task in the first phase of peace negotiations is the identification of the red lines of the 
different parties. This can only be successful within an environment of trust. To this end, 
further confidence-building measures are conceivable, such as prisoner exchanges and a 
removal of Taliban leaders from the UN sanctions list. Another proposal is the involvement 
of 
“the Taliban in ‘joint’ projects with a group or groups they trust [which] might give the Taliban a 
more tangible stake in society. […] Once they have taken a small step to support development of 
the country (this is how it should be presented) it becomes harder for them to reverse direction. 
They become accountable and responsible for their work”. (Foxley 2013: 38) 
 The representatives of the insurgency who join negotiations should be convinced that they 
can change the political system within the framework of the constitution of Afghanistan. 
A major incentive is that most of them are based in Pakistan, but long for more independ-
ence from the ISI (Waldman/Wright 2014: 23). Instead of blaming a Taliban/ISI alliance for 
instability in Afghanistan, Afghan politicians should frame negotiations as a chance for the 
Afghan Taliban to emancipate themselves from their Pakistani patrons. As a political party, 
they would have the right to act openly but independently within Afghanistan and they 
could influence the political developments as long as Afghans vote for them. To signal the 
willingness of the Afghan government to open this road, a discussion about changes to the 
constitution in the Loya Jirga could be proposed. The Government of National Unity plans 
a reform of the constitution in order to transform the position of the CEO into a Prime 
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Minister within the next two years. Possible issues to be reformed that could be of interest 
to the Taliban as well to other parties could be: 
– Decentralization: During their election campaigns, Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf 
Ghani have announced their support for a decentralization of the political system in or-
der to better represent the diversity of the country. While the Taliban did not officially 
announce their support for this policy, it might be in their interest, since it reflects their 
decentralized structure (Waldman/Wright 2014: 14). 
– Provincial governors: Currently, the provincial governors are appointed by the President. 
In the context of the decentralization, this task could be transferred to the provincial 
councils. This could be a plus for the insurgency, since they are more likely to be able to 
influence politics on district and provincial levels, especially in their Southern strong-
holds. Furthermore, the role of the provincial governors should be defined more precise-
ly. With more clearly defined and locally integrated positions, the provincial governors 
could also play a significant role in reconciliation programs (Semple 2009: 58–59). 
– Election law: According to the Government of National Unity reform plans, a new elec-
tion law will be implemented before the 2015 parliamentary elections. A broad participa-
tion in preparation and organization could lead to a higher degree of acceptance of the 
results. Since it is probably unrealistic to get the insurgents’ buy-in already for this round 
of elections, the government could try to convince the insurgency to at least not openly 
attack the elections, but to only “boycott” them. 
When addressing changes to the constitution, it is important to be aware of ethnic tensions: 
“Claims of discrimination or unfair distribution of resources or power are a major potential 
cause of social unrest and violence” (Sheikh/Greenwood 2013: 33). Another challenge is that not 
only members of the government, but also international actors and their constituencies are op-
posed to an inclusion of insurgent groups into the political system: The US Congress would not 
accept a negotiation approach that could lead to a perceived threat of American national security. 
The restriction of human rights will also not be acceptable for important external stakeholders. 
However, the Taliban already control a significant part of Afghanistan, and their territorial influ-
ence is likely to expand without a peace agreement (Waldman/Wright 2014: 14). Opinion polls 
among Afghan elders suggest that for them, the “best-case scenario for the future was a peace 
settlement, where the Taliban would be incorporated into a coalition government” (Giustozzi 
2014: 25). 
As previously analyzed, Taliban commanders and fighters are motivated by diverse and often 
local motives (Bew et al. 2013: 47). Consequently, parts of the Taliban could feel that they are not 
included in formal negotiations and might join factions opposed to a peace agreement, such as 
the Mahaz-e Fedayeen (ICG 2014: 6). A new generation of young and radical Taliban might not 
be willing to denounce their affiliation to international jihadist organizations (Bew et al. 2013: 
47). Additionally, “certain power-holders, including warlords, drug-traffickers and local com-
manders, have an interest in continuing instability, given the profits available in the war econo-
my” (Waldman/Wright 2014: 13). For these reasons, “one might expect an intensification of 
violence in those periods when peace talks take place” (Sheikh 2013: 11). 
Efforts to integrate insurgents on a lower level into the political system have been made in 
programs such as the Prosay-e Tahkim-e Solh and the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Pro-
gram (APRP). These programs are based on the idea that many fighters are not motivated by 
political reasons and thus can be convinced to lay down their arms if given the right incentives. 
These programs have not been successful, mainly because they failed to address insurgents ac-
tively included in fighting and could not provide alternatives and protection against the Taliban 
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(Ayman 2013: 5–6; Semple 2009: 55). All these issues have to be considered when sequencing 
peace talks. Once a peace process has been successfully launched, the following suggestions might 
be helpful in order to avoid impasse and secure sustainability: 
 Because of the risk of radicalization of local insurgents and of the failure to reconcile indi-
viduals, confidence-building measures should not address only the Taliban leadership, and 
not only their Islamic Emirate, but the broad range of the Afghan insurgency. “Any deal 
that appears to give preferential treatment to the Taliban is likely to spark a significant 
backlash” from other militant groups (ICG 2012: ii).  
 The Afghan insurgency is a mainly national actor and should be given the chance to inte-
grate itself into the political system. A tricky issue is the status of US and NATO troops in 
Afghanistan. The Taliban demand their complete withdrawal which is unacceptable for the 
Afghan government. A possible way out could be a referendum: Taliban, government, and 
NATO and US all claim to have the best interest of the Afghans in mind, so no one should 
have objections to asking the people if they support a limited, military assistance presence 
for an interim timeframe. Potentially, such an idea could be floated in order to test the will-
ingness of the insurgency to accept voting as a national decision-making tool if it is not as-
sociated with the current constitution and related elections (which the Taliban do not rec-
ognize). 
 A bilateral component of a treaty system that defuses the regional security dilemma could 
be a non-aggression agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, including a prohibition 
of the support of armed groups in the other country and credible verification and monitor-
ing mechanisms. Pakistan would stop interfering in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, and 
Afghanistan would accept the Durand line as the official border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan and declare its neutrality concerning Pakistani-Indian relations. Such an inclusion 
of Pakistan into the peace process would not only have a positive impact on economic de-
velopment, but would also help to reach out to the Afghan insurgency and reduce incen-
tives to Pakistan to hedge their bets by strengthening its ties with the Taliban. 
 An “all-in” solution to the security dilemma could be a Standing Conference for Security 
and Co-operation in Central Asia modeled on the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe. As the Istanbul Process has shown, a main obstacle would be the will-
ingness of relevant states, such as Russia, Iran, and Pakistan, to commit themselves to long-
term, multilateral frameworks. Turkey may have the potential to mediate and to give a pro-
ject for more regional integration another push. Given its strong cultural and historical 
connection with Afghanistan, Turkey is perceived as a friendly state and has already made 
significant efforts at initiating peace talks and summits with Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
China also has recently embraced intra-Afghan reconciliation efforts and could also play a 
more active, productive, facilitating role in regional politics. The “Gulf stream” of money 
from the Arabian Peninsula into the region can be turned into an asset, if it is not chan-
neled to projects which primarily serve geostrategic and sectarian purposes and ultimately 
strengthen militant Islamist movements that also the donors cannot control. The Arab 
States of the Persian Gulf should thus be encouraged to increase their economic aid for the 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, especially in education, health care, and housing. 
 To support this process, the US and the international community should commit to long-
term support for Afghanistan and the region, potentially in the form of a “Stability Pact for 
Central Asia.” From a Western perspective, further assistance and involvement in Central 
Asia could both have a strategic and a humanitarian motive: Decreasing interest of EU and 
US in the region combined with the withdrawal of NATO troops could invite a greater in-
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volvement and influence of other powers such as Russia, Iran, and China (Kassenova 2014: 
29). But also, after more than a decade of war and NATO military involvement, it would be 
cynical to simply retreat without committing to correcting mistakes and mitigating the con-
sequences of one’s own presence. Peace in Afghanistan can only be achieved with domestic 
reconciliation, regional cooperation, and international support. A peaceful and stable Af-
ghanistan would be a benefit for all neighboring countries and for Central Asia. 
Official, inclusive peace negotiations in Afghanistan might not be successful. Perhaps the fric-
tions within the insurgency are too strong, the political environment is too hostile, and the con-
flict is too intertwined with regional politics. But it is an option worth trying. Even some Taliban 
commanders see peace and security as their final goal: “I want the world to remove their young 
guys from Afghanistan, not to see them killed, and them not to kill our young guys; and not to 
cause our women and children to cry, or to make your women and your children cry” (quoted by 
Waldman 2010: 6). 
48 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
References 
ABC/BBC/ARD 2009: Afghanistan: Where Things Stand, 9 February, New York City, NY/London/Frankfurt 
a.M.. 
ACSFo 2012: ACSFo Strategy Paper 2012–2014, http://bit.ly/1KhFFyG (16 July 2014). 
ACSFo 2014: Gofteguy-e mardom-e Afghanistan piramun-e solh, Ijad-e mabani baray-e prose-e faragir-e solh, 
http://bit.ly/1NARFgA (18 July 2014). 
Afsar, Shahid/Samples, Chris/Wood, Thomas 2008: The Taliban. An Organizational Analysis, in: Military 
Review, 88: 3 (May/June 2008): 58–73. 
Ahmadiar, Najibullah 2014: Ashraf Ghani rais-e jumhur-e montachab nist – vali-e balkh, Voice of America, 
http://bit.ly/1EglyzA (23 September 2014). 
Afghan Civil Society Actors 2013: Afghanistan beyond 2014: Elections, Political Settlement. Reforms Recommen-
dations from Afghan Civil Society, Heinrich Böll Foundation, http://bit.ly/1JtGRcX (19 September 2014). 
Alternative News Turkmenistan 2014: “Na zagranichnye punkty Turkmenistana soversheno napadenie”, 
http://habartm.org/archives/1272 (3 September 2014). 
Amiry, Sharif 2014: Afghan HPC’s Policies Toward the Taliban a Failure, 24 September 2014, Tolo News, 
http://bit.ly/1Ei0F79 (29 September 2014). 
Arab News 2014: Turkey, Afghanistan Sign Cooperation Deal, www.arabnews.com/news/646581 (19 October 
2014). 
AREU 2014: The A to Z Guide to Assistance in Afghanistan, http://bit.ly/1UcIFNB (16 July 2014). 
Asia Foundation 2013: Afghanistan in 2013. A Survey of the Afghan People, Kabul. 
Ayman, S. Gülden 2013: Reconciliation with the Taliban: Challenges and Prospects, in: Journal of Security 
Strategies, 17, 1–22. 
Baryalay, Maryam 2014: Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah, A Brief Comparison, Tolo News, 12 June, 
http://bit.ly/1PxLrvt (25 September 2014). 
BBC News Asia 2014: Ashraf Ghani Sworn in as New President, 29 September 2014, http://bbc.in/1qNViPx 
(30 September 2014). 
BBC News Middle East 2013: United Arab Emirates Arrests ‘al-Qaeda Terror Suspects’, 
http://bbc.in/1MMAUgA (18 April 2013). 
BBC News South Asia 2001: Profile: General Rashid Dostum, 25 September 2001, http://bbc.in/1NHI7PS  
(25 September 2014). 
BBC News South Asia 2014: The Mammoth Military Task of Leaving Afghanistan, http://bbc.in/1nnPUqT  
(28 January 2014). 
Bell, Arvid 2013: Verhandeln statt Bürgerkrieg: Ein Plädoyer für Waffenstillstand und offizielle Friedensge-
spräche in Afghanistan, HSFK-Report, Nr. 4, Frankfurt a.M.. 
Bew, John/Evans, Ryan/Frampton, Martyn et al. 2013: Talking to the Taliban. Hope over History?, The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence, London. 
Biddle, Stephen 2013: War Termination in Afghanistan. Prepared Statement before the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs; Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa & Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 
United States House of Representatives, 1st Session, 113th Congress, Hearing on “After the Withdrawal: 
The Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” 29 October. 
Blanchard, Christopher M. 2014: Qatar: Background and U.S Relations, in: Congressional Research Service 
(CSR) Report for Congress (30 January 2014). 
BMZ 2010: Evaluation Reports 049. Assessing the Impact of Development Cooperation in North East 
Afghanistan 2005-2009, Final Report, Bonn/Berlin. 
Böge, Friederike 2014: Der Scharfmacher von Mazar-i-Sharif, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 17 September. 
Boucek, Christopher 2010: Saudi Arabia, in: Tellis, Ashley. J./Mukharji, Aroop 2010: Is a Regional Strategy 
Viable in Afghanistan? Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 45–50. 
Bowman, Steve/Dale, Catherine 2009: War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, 3 December 2009, Washington, DC. 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 49
 
 
Brahimi, Lakhdar/Pickering, Thomas R. 2011: Afghanistan. Negotiating Peace. The Report of the Century 
Foundation International Task Force on Afghanistan in its Regional and Multilateral Dimensions, New 
York. 
Brand, Matthew C. 2011: General McChrystal’s Strategic Assessment. Evaluating the Operating Environment 
in Afghanistan in the Summer of 2009, Air Force Research Institute Papers, 2011-1, Maxwell Air Force 
Base. 
Broschk, Florian 2011: Ideologische Facetten der Taliban, in: Conrad Schetter, Jörgen Klußmann (ed.), Der 
Taliban-Komplex. Zwischen Aufstandsbewegung und Militäreinsatz, Frankfurt a.M., 81–108. 
Bruton, Bronwyn 2009: On the Quicksands of Somalia: Where Doing Less Helps More, in Foreign Affairs, 
88: 6 (November/December), 79–94. 
Chayes, Sara 2012: A Forgotten Player in a Post-2014 Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, The Diplomat, 
http://bbc.in/1nnPUqT (8 August 2012). 
Checcia, Mark E. 2012: The Mansur Network, Afghanistan Resource Desk, Civil-Military Fusion Centre, 
January 2012. 
Chesterman, Simon 2002: Walking Softly in Afghanistan: The Future of UN State-Building, in: Survival, 44: 3, 
37–46. 
CIA World Factbook 2013: Tajikistan, http://1.usa.gov/1Lw8F4d (12 September 2013). 
CIA World Factbook 2013a: Qatar, http://1.usa.gov/1NHIyd1 (12 September 2013). 
Clark, Kate 2014a: Elections 2014 (26): The Other Possible Vice President – Dr Abdullah’s Running Mate 
Muhammad Khan, AAN, 12 June, http://bit.ly/1i17bp7 (25 September 2014). 
Clark, Kate 2014b: Elections 2014 (51): Finally, a Deal, but Not Yet Democracy, AAN, 21 September, 
http://bit.ly/1NHIz0u (25 September 2014). 
Clark, Kate 2014c: Elections 2014 (52): Ghani Sworn In as Afghanistan’s New President, AAN, 30 September, 
http://bit.ly/1DV0b3D (30 September 2014). 
Cooley, Alexander 2012: Great Games, Local Rules, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Cooley, Alexander/Laruelle, Marlene 2013: The Changing Logic of Russian Strategy in Central Asia. From 
Privileged Sphere to Divide and Rule?, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 261, July, Elliot School of 
International Affairs, George Washington University. 
Crawford, Neta C. 2011: Assessing the Human Toll of the Post-9/11 Wars: The Dead and Wounded in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, 2001–2011. 
CSIS Experts in the Field 2010: Northern Distribution Network, in: Center for Strategic and International 
Studies, Transnational Threats Project, http://bit.ly/1DV0b3D (7 January 2010). 
Dale, Catherine 2011: War in Afghanistan: Strategy, Operations, and Issues for Congress, Congressional 
Research Service, 9 March. 
Daud, Malaiz 2014: Afghanistan and the Regional Powers: An Overview of 2013, in: Barcelona Centre for 
International Affairs. 
Destradi, Sandra 2014: India: A Reluctant Partner for Afghanistan, in: Washington Quarterly, 37: 2, 103–117. 
Dostum, Abdulrashid 2014a: Accomplishments, http://bit.ly/1he1Bil (25 September 2014). 
Dostum, Abdulrashid 2014b: Biography, http://generaldostum.com/2010/04/22/biography/ (25 September 2014). 
Dostum, Abdulrashid 2014c: Conflict & Controversy, http://generaldostum.com/2010/01/25/post-title-5/  
(25 September 2014). 
Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the USA 2013: Commitment to Assist Afghanistan, 
http://bit.ly/1WROnbN (11 September 2013). 
Express Tribune 2014: Vicious Year: Terrorism Surged in 2013, Says Report, 6 January. 
FAS 2014: World Islamic Front Statement, 23 February 1998, as quoted in: Federation of American Scientists, 
www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm (26 March 2014). 
Fearon, James/Laitin, David 2003: Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, in: American Political Science Review, 
97: 1, 75–90. 
Felbab-Brown, Vanda 2014: Afghanistan in 2013: On the Cusp…or on the Brink?, in: Asian Survey, 54: 1, 
January/February, 165–176. 
Foxley, Tim 2013: Messaging the Taliban, in: Sheikh, Mona K./Greenwood, Maja T. J. (ed.), Taliban Talks. 
Past, Present and Prospects for the US, Afghanistan and Pakistan, DIIS Report 2013: 6. 
50 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
Ghani, Ashraf 2005: TED Talks July 2005, http://bit.ly/1LA2eA2 (25 September 2014). 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2003: Respectable Warlords? The Politics of State-Building in Post-Taleban Afghanistan, 
Working Paper No. 33, Crisis States Programme, Development Research Center, London School of 
Economics. 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2009: One or Many? The Issue of the Taliban’s Unity and Disunity, Pakistan Security 
Research Unit (PSRU), Brief Number 48, 23 April. 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2010: Negotiating with the Taliban. Issues and Prospects, A Century Foundation Report, 
New York/Washington DC. 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2012a: The Resilient Oligopoly: A Political-Economy of Northern Afghanistan 2001 and 
Onwards, in: Issues Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2013: The Next Congo: Regional Competition for Influence in Afghanistan in the Wake of 
NATO Withdrawal, Afghanistan Regional Forum 10, George Washington University. 
Giustozzi, Antonio 2014: The Taliban and the 2014 Elections in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace. 
Gretsky, Sergei 1995: Civil War in Tajikistan: Causes, Developments, and Prospects for Peace, in Central Asia: 
Conflict, Resolution and Change, ed. by Roald Sagdeyev and Susan Eisenhower, Center for Post-Soviet 
Studies, Washington D.C. 
Gulf News 2014: UAE Long-Standing Partner of Afghanistan and its Government, http://bit.ly/1LA2uPI  
(19 October 2014). 
Hassan, Oz/Hammond, Andrew 2011: The Rise and Fall of America’s Freedom Agenda in Afghanistan: 
Counter-Terrorism, Nation-Building and Democracy, in: The International Journal of Human Rights,  
15: 4, May, 532–551. 
Harooni, Mirwais 2014: Top Official Says Chinese Security Depends on Afghan Stability, Reuters, 
http://reut.rs/1iwhZso (22 February 2014). 
Herbert, Siân 2014: State Legitimacy in Afghanistan and the Role of the International Community, Helpdesk 
Research Report, www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/HDQ1068.pdf (5 September 2014). 
Huasheng, Zhao 2012: China and Afghanistan: China’s Interests, Stances and Perspectives, Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies, http://bit.ly/1bkvz1G (March 2012).  
Human Rights Unit of UNAMA 2014: Afghanistan Annual Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict: 2013. 
Human Rights Watch 2005: Blood-Stained Hands. Past Atrocities in Kabul and Afghanistan’s Legacy of 
Impunity, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0605.pdf (26 September 2014). 
ISW 2013: Tajikistan and Afghanistan, www.understandingwar.org/tajikistan-and-afghanistan (11 September 
2013). 
ISW 2014: Turkmenistan and Afghanistan, www.understandingwar.org/turkmenistan-and-afghanistan  
(17 March 2014). 
International Security Assistance Force 2014: Troop Numbers and Contributions, http://bit.ly/1fFrKWa  
(14 February 2014). 
International Crisis Group 2012: Talking About Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan, Asia 
Report N°221, http://bit.ly/1i19bO3 (19 September 2014). 
International Crisis Group 2014: Afghanistan’s Insurgency after the Transition, Asia Report N°256, 
http://bit.ly/1l7CdqF (25 August 2014). 
IEA 2012: The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Financial Commission, http://bit.ly/1NASC8x (31 October 
2013, translation corrected by the author). 
IEA 2014a: Remarks of Spokesman of Islamic Emirate Regarding Civilian Casualties Report by UNAMA, 
http://bit.ly/1he3kEv (14 March 2014). 
IEA 2014b: American Election Process is the Continuation of Invasion!, http://bit.ly/1he3nzW (25 August 2014). 
International Organization for Migration 2013: Ministerial Conference on Refugee Protection and International 
Migration: The Almaty Process, http://bit.ly/1LwajTI (5 June 2013).  
Jackson, Ashley/Giustozzi, Antonio 2012: Talking to the Other Side. Humanitarian Engagement with the 
Taliban in Afghanistan, HPG Working Paper, December, London. 
Johnson, Thomas H./DuPee, Matthew C. 2012: Analysing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha): An 
Assessment of Changing Perspectives and Strategies of the Afghan Taliban, in: Central Asian Survey, 21: 1, 
77–91. 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 51
 
 
Jones, Seth G./Crane, Keith 2013: Afghanistan after the Drawdown, in: Council on Foreign Relations, Center 
for Preventive Action, Council Special Report No. 67. 
Joscelyn, Thomas 2014: Pakistan’s Proxies, Al-Qaeda’s Allies, in: Allies, Adversaries & Enemies: America’s 
Increasingly Complex Alliances, FDD Press. 
Kamrava, Mehran 2011: Mediation and Qatari Foreign Policy, in: Middle East Journal 65: 4, 539–556. 
Kantor, Paula/Pain, Adam 2011: Running Out of Options. Tracing Rural Afghan Livelihoods, Synthesis Paper 
Series, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul. 
Kassenova, Nargis 2014: Relations Between Afghanistan and Central Asian States After 2014, Stockholm 
International Research Institute, May. 
Katuli, Brian 2013: Qatar, Saudi Arabia Diverge in Battle to Shape Changing Middle East, World Politics 
Review, http://bit.ly/1IfodEQ (31 May 2013). 
Katzman, Kenneth 2014a: Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S Policy, Congressional 
Research Service, 4 March. 
Katzman, Kenneth 2014b: The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S Policy, Congressional Research 
Service, 24 February. 
Katzman, Kenneth 2014: Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S Policy, Congressional 
Research Service, 9 October.  
Kaya, Karen 2013: Turkey’s Role in Afghanistan and Afghan Stabilization, in: Military Review July/August: 
23–30. 
Kazemi, Resa S. 2013: Afghanistan Conference in Kazakhstan: Will the ‘Heart of Asia’ Start Throbbing?, 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, http://bit.ly/1KjGpmX (5 April 2013). 
Kazemi, Resa S. 2014: Will the ‘Heart of Asia’ Start Beating? A Review of the Regional Co-Operation Process, 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, http://bit.ly/1NTQplO (26 September 2014). 
Kim, Younkyoo/Indeo, Fabio 2013: The New Great Game in Central Asia Post 2014: The US ‘New Silk Road’ 
Strategy and Sino-Russian Rivalry, in: Communist and Post-Communist Studies 46, 275–286. 
Klein, Margarete/Kaim, Markus 2014: NATO-Russia Relations after the Newport Summit, Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, 2 October.  
Köchler, Hans 2008: The Kashmir Problem between Law and Realpolitik: Reflections on a Negotiated Settlement. 
Keynote Speech, Global Discourse on Kashmir 2008: “Indo-Pak Changing Perceptions on Kashmir,” jointly 
organized All-Party Group on Kashmir in the European Parliament (APGK) and International Council on 
Human Rights/Kashmir Centre.EU, Brussels, 1 April, http://bit.ly/1hWbQs2 (9 September 2015). 
Kordaş, Şaban 2013: Turkey’s Regional Approach in Afghanistan: A Civilian Power in Action, in: Center for 
Strategic Research, Policy Brief No. 6. 
Koepke, Bruce 2013: Iran’s Policy on Afghanistan: The Evolution of Strategic Pragmatism, Stockholm Peace 
Research Institute, September.  
Kramer, Andrew E. 2013: As NATO Prepares for Afghan Withdrawal, Uzbekistan Seeks War’s Leftovers, New 
York Times, 31 January. 
Laruelle, Marlene/Peyrose, Sebastien/Axyonova, Vera 2013: The Afghanistan-Central Asia Relationship: What 
Role for the EU? in: Europe-Central Asia Monitoring, Working Paper 13. 
Laub, Zachary 2013: Prospects for Afghanistan in 2014. Interview with Jones, Seth G. Expert Roundup, 
Council on Foreign Relations, http://on.cfr.org/1JiHV4t (18 December 2013). 
Library of Congress 2004: Country Profile: India, Federal Research Division, December 2004, Washington DC. 
Lillis, Joanna 2014: Kazakhstan Arrests Four Bloggers in a Week, Eurasianet, www.eurasianet.org/node/68027 
(11 February 2014). 
Lillis, Joanna 2014a: Kazakhstan: Almaty Police Arrest Anti-Devaluation Protesters, Eurasianet, 
www.eurasianet.org/node/68051 (15 February 2014). 
Lowther, William/Freeman, Colin 2007: US Funds Terror Groups to Sow Chaos in Iran, The Telegraph, 
25 February 2007. 
Lundin, Lars-Erik/van Kaathoven, Kirsten 2013: Perils of The Drug Trade: Implications and Challenges of 
Central Asia’s “Northern Route,” in: Institute for Security and Development Policy. Policy Brief No. 125, 
29 May. 
Mac Ginty, Roger 2010: Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-Building in Afghanistan, in: Conflict, Security & 
Development, 10: 4, 577–598. 
52 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
Margesson, Rhoda 2010: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan: Background and Policy Issues, in: 
Congressional Research Service. 
Marten, Kimberly 2007: Warlordism in Comparative Perspective, in: International Security, 31: 3 (Winter 
2006/07), 41–73. 
Merkel, Katharina 2014: Peace versus Justice: A False Dichotomy? Mapping Tensions and Complementarities 
between Conflict Resolution and Human Rights Advocacy in Afghanistan, in: Journal of Conflictology,  
5: 1, 19–23. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan 2014: Cooperation of the Republic of Kazakhstan with the United 
Nations Organization, http://bit.ly/1NTQOoc (29 January 2014). 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey 2013: Turkey-Afghanistan Economic and Trade Relations, 
http://bit.ly/1NHJbTR (12 September 2013). 
Mir, Haroun 2010: Through Their Eyes. Possibilities for a Regional Approach to Afghanistan, in: Tellis, 
Ashley. J./Mukharji, Aroop, Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan? Washington DC: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1–16. 
Mukhopadhyay, Dipali 2009: Warlords as Bureaucrats: The Afghan Experience, Carnegie Papers, Number 
101, August, Middle East Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 
Mukhopadhyay, Dipali 2014: Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan, New York. 
Mujtaba, Bahaudin G. 2013: Ethnic Diversity, Distrust and Corruption in Afghanistan, in: Equality, Diversity 
and Inclusion: An International Journal, 32: 3, 245–261. 
Mustafa, Awad 2014: UAE to Double Security Budget, Focus on Cyber, defensenews.com, http://bit.ly/1Ejp10P 
(24 February 2014). 
Nichol, Jim 2013a: Kazakhstan: Recent Developments and U.S Interests, in: Congressional Research Service, 
Report for Congress (22 June). 
Nichol, Jim 2013b: Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S Interests, in: Congressional Research Service, 
Report for Congress (21 August). 
Norwegian Helsinki Committee 2012: A Chronicle of Violence: The Events in the South of Kyrgyzstan in June 
2010 (Osh region), Oslo: Report No. 2. 
Novak, Paolo 2013: The Success of Afghan NGOs, in: Development in Practice, 23: 7 (September), 872–888. 
NPR 2010: Abdullah Abdullah: Talks with Taliban Futile, http://n.pr/1U5WySV (22 October 2010). 
Olcott, Martha B. 2010: Central Asian Republics, in: Tellis, Ashley. J./Mukharji, Aroop, Is a Regional Strategy 
Viable in Afghanistan? Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 51–59. 
Office of the President of the IRoA 2014a: Doktar Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai va Doktar Abdullah Abdullah 
morasem-e tahlif-e shanra baja avardand, 29 September, http://bit.ly/1MTdI1V (30 September 2014). 
Office of the President of the IRoA 2014b: Dr. Ashraf Ghani Meets Iran’s Vice President, 
http://president.gov.af/en/news/36978 (30 September 2014). 
OXFAM 2009: The Cost of War. Afghan Experiences of Conflict, 1978–2009. 
Partlow, Joshua 2010: Minority Leaders Leaving Karzai’s Side over Leader’s Overtures to Insurgents, 
Washington Post, 23 July, http://wapo.st/1IfpsUD (25 September 2014). 
Petersen, Alexandros 2012: How the West is Wholly Missing China’s Geopolitical Focus, Foreign Policy, 
http://atfp.co/1JlDpEk (10 January 2012). 
Pickering, Thomas R. 2011: Negotiating Afghanistan. When? With Whom? About What?, in: Prism, 3: 1, 
12/2011, 21–36. 
Price, Gareth 2013: India’s Developing International Role, Observer Research Foundation Issue Brief #52, 
June. 
Qazi, Shehzad H. 2011: An Extended Profile of the Pakistani Taliban, Policy Brief #44, August, Institute for 
Social Policy and Understanding. 
Quie, Marissa 2014: The Istanbul Process: Prospects for Regional Connectivity in the Heart of Asia, in: Asia 
Europe Journal 12, 285–300. 
Quinn-Judge, Paul 2010: Conventional Security Risks to Central Asia: A Summary Overview, in: China and 
Eurasia Quarterly 8: 2, 53–63. 
Rassler, Don/Brown, Vahid 2011: The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida, Harmony Program, 
Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 53
 
 
Reporters without Borders 2013: Press Freedom Index 2013, Paris. 
RFE/RL 2014: Turkmenistan’s New Afghan Border Policy, http://bit.ly/1i1e0XN (10 October 2014). 
Ruttig, Thomas 2011a: Jamiat after Rabbani. The Competition for the Top Job, Afghanistan Analysts Network, 
http://bit.ly/1KjLco9 (23 October 2011). 
Ruttig, Thomas 2011b: Right and Justice Party Launched, as ‘Reformist Opposition,’ Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, http://bit.ly/1EjrJ6c (3 November 2011). 
Ruttig, Thomas 2011c: Elastisch und stabil: Organisationsstrukturen und Ideologie der afghanischen Taliban, 
in: Conrad Schetter/Jörgen Klußmann (ed.), Der Taliban-Komplex. Zwischen Aufstandsbewegung und 
Militäreinsatz, Frankfurt a.M.: Campus Verlag, 31–56. 
Ruttig, Thomas 2011d: Der Westen unterstützt eine korrupte Regierung. Interview zur Situation in 
Afghanistan, 15 December, http://bit.ly/vggh0d (4 September 2014). 
Ruttig, Thomas 2012: A Katanga Scenario for Afghanistan? (amended), Afghanistan Analysts Network, 
www.afghanistan-analysts.org/a-katanga-scenario-for-afghanistan-amended (19 January 2012). 
Ruttig, Thomas 2014: The Start into the Better Governance Marathon: Ghani’s First Days, 11 October, 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, http://bit.ly/1EiaD8y (13 October 2014). 
Roberts, David 2013: Qatar’s Foreign Policy Adventurism, Foreign Affairs, http://fam.ag/1PStE2Y (25 June 2013). 
Roy, Olivier 2005: The Predicament of ‘Civil Society’ in Central Asia and the ‘Greater Middle East’, in: 
International Affairs, 81: 5 (October), 1001–1012. 
Sadykov, Murat 2013: Turkmenistan Supplying over Half of Chinese Gas Imports, Eurasianet, 
www.eurasianet.org/node/67356 (6 August 2013). 
Saleh, Amrullah 2011: Afghan Role for Taliban, If They Play by Rules: Amrullah Saleh, BloombergView, 
http://bv.ms/1LA6bEV (16 June 2011). 
Schetter, Conrad 2004: Kleine Geschichte Afghanistans, München: C. H. Beck. 
Schetter, Conrad/Glassner, Rainer/Karokhail, Masood 2007: Beyond Warlordism. The Local Security 
Architecture in Afghanistan, in: IPG, 2/2007, 136–152. 
Scobell, Andrew 2015: China Ponders Post-2014 Afghanistan: Neither “All in” Nor Bystander, in: Asian 
Survey, 55: 2 (March/April), 325–345. 
Semple, Michael 2009: Reconciliation in Afghanistan, United States Institute of Peace, Perspectives Series, 
Washington, DC. 
Sheikh, Mona K. 2013: Where Are We now? Reintegration, Reconciliation and Negotiation with the Taliban, 
in: Sheikh, Mona K./Greenwood, Maja T. J. (ed.), Taliban Talks. Past, Present and Prospects for the US, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, DIIS Report 2013: 06. 
Sheikh, Mona K./Greenwood Maja T. J. 2013: The Reconciliation Process in review, in: Sheikh, Mona 
K./Greenwood, Maja T. J. (ed.), Taliban Talks. Past, Present and Prospects for the US, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, DIIS Report 2013: 06. 
Sindelar, Daisy/Toiken, Sania 2012: A Year after Deadly Riots, Zhanaozen Is Quiet but Angry, Radio Free 
Europe, www.rferl.org/content/zhanaozen-a-year-after-the-riots/24798726.html (16 December 2012). 
Simonsen, Sven Gunnar 2004: Ethnicising Afghanistan? Inclusion and Exclusion in Post-Bonn Institution 
Building, in: Third World Quarterly, 25: 4, 707–729. 
Stanford/NYU 2012: Living Under Drones. Death, Injury, and Trauma to Civilians From US Drone Practices 
in Pakistan, International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic (Stanford Law School) and Global 
Justice Clinic (NYU School of Law), September 2012. 
Stein, Matthew 2012: Uzbekistan’s View of Security in Afghanistan After 2014, in: Military Review, May/June, 
75–81. 
Suhrke, Astri 2013: Statebuilding in Afghanistan: A Contradictory Engagement, in: Central Asian Survey,  
32: 3, 271–286. 
Tellis, Ashley J. 2010: Implementing a Regional Approach to Afghanistan. Multiple Alternatives, Modest 
Possibilities, in: Tellis, Ashley. J./Mukharji, Aroop, Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan? 
Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 85–124. 
The World Bank 2013: Migration and Remittance Flows: Recent Trends and Outlook, 2013–2016, World 
Bank Migration and Development Brief 21. 
The World Bank 2014: Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (CASA-1000), 
http://www.worldbank.org/projects/P145054?lang=en (19 September 2014).  
54 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
Tolo News 2014: Abdullah Abdullah, http://elections2014.tolonews.com/abdullah-abdullah (25 September 2014). 
Transparency International 2014: Corruption Perceptions Index 2014, http://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results 
(14 August 2015). 
Trenin, Dmitri 2010: Russia, in: Tellis, Ashley. J./Mukharji, Aroop, Is a Regional Strategy Viable in 
Afghanistan? Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 45–50. 
Ulrichsen, Kristian C. 2012: The UAE: Holding Back the Tie. Open Democracy, http://bit.ly/1MMQB7y  
(5 August 2012). 
Ulrichsen, Kristian C. 2014: The Persian Gulf States and Afghanistan: Regional Geopolitics and Competing 
Interests, in: Afghanistan Beyond 2014: The Search for Security in the Heart of Asia, in: Asia Policy, 1–65. 
UN 2014: A/68/988–S/2014/656, The Situation in Afghanistan and Its Implications for International Peace 
and Security, 18 June. 
UNAMA 2014: Afghanistan, Annual Report 2013, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, Kabul. 
UNGA 1995: A/RES/50/80, 12 December. 
UNHRC 2014: Afghanistan, Midyear Report 2014, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, July, Kabul. 
UN News Centre 2014: Turkmenistan Leader Says UN Must Lead in Preserving Stability, Strengthening Faith 
in Institutions, http://bit.ly/1PxSMLm (24 September 2014). 
UNSC 2014: S/RES/2145, 17 March. 
Upadhyay, Dadan 2013: Russia, Uzbekistan Agree to Join Hands to Meet Afghanistan Threats, Russia and 
India Report, http://bit.ly/1NAWwOP (18. April 2013). 
U.S. Air Force Fact Sheets 2012: 380th Air Expeditionary Wing History, http://1.usa.gov/1LA6Nu9 (12 May 2012). 
Wadhams, Caroline 2013: Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Elections, Political Settlement, Reforms, in: Center for 
American Progress, http://ampr.gs/1Jvmdt2 (5 September 2013). 
Waldman, Matt 2010: Dangerous Liaisons with the Afghan Taliban. The Feasibility and Risks of Negotiations, 
United States Institute of Peace Special Report 256, October, Washington, DC. 
Waldman, Matt 2013: System Failure: The Underlying Causes of US Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan, 
International Affairs 89: 4, 825–843. 
Waldman, Matt/Wright, Mathew 2014: Who Wants What: Mapping the Parties’ Interests in the Afghanistan 
Conflict, Asia Programme, Chatham House, July. 
Wang, Carol 2014: Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Enabling a Constitutional Framework for Local 
Accountability, in: Harvard International Law Journal, 55: 1 (March), 211–249. 
Williams, Brian Glyn 2012: Afghanistan Declassified: A Guide to America’s Longest War, Philadelphia, PA: 
University of Pennsylvania Press. 
World Bank 2014: Afghanistan Economic Update, http://bit.ly/1KjN68s (4 September 2014). 
Weitz, Richard 2011: Can Turkey Save Afghanistan?, The Diplomat, http://bit.ly/1KjN68s (11 November 2011). 
Winter, Elizabeth 2010: Civil Society Development in Afghanistan, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Centre for Civil Society and ESRC Non-Governmental Public Action Programme, June. 
Yi, Yang 2014: China to Hold Int’l Conference on Afghanistan Issue, http://bit.ly/1PSvy3q (8 March 2014). 
Zaidi, Manzar 2008: A Profile of Mangal Bagh, The Long War Journal. 
Zartman, I. William 2001: The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments, in: The 
Global Review of Ethnopolitics, 1, 8–18. 
Zenko, Micah/Welch, Emma 2012: Where the Drones Are, Foreign Policy, http://atfp.co/1MTi6y6 (29 May 2012).  
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 55
 
 
Abbreviations 
AAN Afghanistan Analysts Network 
ACCI Afghan Chamber of Commerce & Industries 
ADB Asian Development Bank 
ANCB Afghan NGOs Coordination Bureau 
ANSF  Afghan National Security Forces 
APRP Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program 
AQ  Al-Qaeda 
AQAP Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
ASG Abu Sayyaf Group 
AWN Afghan Women’s Network 
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation 
BLA Balochistan Liberation Army 
BLF Baluch Liberation Front 
BSA Bilateral Security Agreement 
CASA Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade Project 
CBM Confidence building measures 
CEO Chief Executive Officer 
CDC Community Development Council 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia 
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States 
CSHRN Civil Society & Human Rights Network 
CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies 
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization 
EAU Eurasian (Economic) Union 
EIJ Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
ETIM East Turkestan Islamic Movement 
EU European Union 
FAS Federation of American Scientists 
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan) 
FCCS Foundation for Culture and Civil Society 
FSB Federal Security Service (Russia) 
FSKN Federal Drug Control Service of the Russian Federation 
GDP Gross domestic product 
GIP General Intelligence Presidency of Saudi Arabia 
Govt. Government 
HA Heart of Asia 
HIG Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin 
HIV human immunodeficiency virus 
56 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
HPC High Peace Council 
HPG Humanitarian Policy Group 
HQN Haqqani Network 
HSM Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen 
HuM Harkat-ul-Mujahideen-al-Islami 
HuJi Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami 
HuT Hizb-ut-Tahir 
ICG International Crisis Group 
IEA Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
IJU Islamic Jihad Union 
IMFEAU Implantation militaire française aux Émirats arabes unis 
IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan 
IP Istanbul Process 
IRGC Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps 
IRoA Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
ISI Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan) 
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
ISW Institute for the Study of War 
JeM Jaish-e-Mohammad 
JI Jemaah Islamiyah 
LeI Lashkar-e-Islam 
LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi 
LeT Lashkar-e-Taiba 
MCC China Metallurgical Group Corporation 
MİT Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı; National Intelligence Organization (Turkey) 
MUJWA Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NDN Northern Distribution Network 
NDS National Directorate of Security (Afghanistan) 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
NPR National Public Radio 
NYU New York University 
OEF Operation Enduring Freedom 
OFS Operation Freedom’s Sentinel 
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation 
PRMI People’s Resistance Movement of Iran 
PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 
RSM Resolute Support Mission 
QIA Qatar Investment Authority 
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
SCOP Supreme Court of Pakistan 
Actors, Interests, and Relationships in Afghanistan and Central Asia 57
 
 
SOFA Status of Forces Agreement 
SSP Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan 
TAPI Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline 
TIKA Turkish International Cooperation and Development Agency 
TNSM Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi 
TTP Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
UAE United Arab Emirates 
UK United Kingdom 
UN  United Nations 
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly 
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
UNHRC  United Nations Human Rights Council 
US; USA United States of America 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WAMY World Assembly of Muslim Youth 
WHO World Health Organization 
WML World Muslim League 
 
58 Arvid Bell with Arundhati Bose, Botakoz Iliyas, and Kyara Klausmann
 
 
Map 
 
Source: Cartographic Research Laboratory, College of Arts and Sciences at The University of Alabama. 
 
